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RACE, MARKETS, AND HOLLYWOOD'S PERPETUAL
ANTITRUST DILEMMA
Hosea H. Harvey*
This Article focuses on the oft-neglected intersection of racially skewed outcomes and
anti-competitive markets. Through historical, contextual, and empirical analysis, the
Article describes the state of Hollywood motion-picture distribution from its anti-
competitive beginnings through the industry's role in creating an anti-competitive,
racially divided market at the end of the last century. The Article's evidence suggests
that race-based inefficiencies have plagued the film distribution process and such
inefficiencies might likely be caused by the anti-competitive structure of the market
itself, and not merely by overt or intentional racial-discrimination. After explaining
why traditional anti-discrimination laws are ineffective remedies for such
inefficiencies, the Article asks whether antitrust remedies and market mechanisms
mght provide more robust solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines racially skewed outcomes in an unfamiliar
context-outside of the familiar rubric of traditional anti-discrimination
regimes. Law scholars have not given adequate attention to a fairly signifi-
cant problem: the fact that non-competitive markets fuel inefficient and
racially-skewed outcomes beyond labor market distortions. Economic
outcomes relating to production, creation, and distribution of goods and
services are also affected.' In these markets, where we see a form of anti-
competitive racial impasse, how can we more easily determine whether
racial inequities remain, what causes them, and how the law can reduce or
eliminate them? The typical framework for analyzing such problems
might rest in antitrust law, but typical antitrust frameworks rarely view
market inefficiencies primarily through the lens of racial equality.
The difficulty in connecting antitrust law with the goal of remedy-
ing racially skewed market outcomes is underscored by a frank scholarly
admission: "[T]here seems to be a widespread, implicit belief (at least
among [W]hite males) that race and gender discrimination is not a serious
problem" in markets defined by products and not workers.2 Accordingly,
scholars have engaged in just a few studies of the role that race plays in
structuring modern marketplace interactions between seller and buyer
and the overall racially polarized structure of market movements within
industries. The lack of credible information, particularly regarding the
role of race in structuring decisions about what to sell and to whom, is
troubling if one cares about remedying these market problems. The Arti-
cle's empirical analysis and supporting contextual research regarding the
market for Hollywood feature films suggests that racial differentials in
marketplace outcomes, primarily in film distribution differentials, are
1. Studying the real-life consequences of racial bias in these markets is not an en-
tirely new phenomenon, but it is still a largely undeveloped field. [an Ayres is among
leaders in the field and has made many important contributions. Prior to his widely cited
car audit experiment, few legal scholars had broached the subject. See, e.g., Ian Ayres &
Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 304 (1995); see also IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) [hereinafter PERVASIVE PREJUDICE].
2. PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 1, at 3.
3. See, e.g., id. Ayres notes that "almost no one has tested whether consumers' taste
for discrimination might be directed at a seller's race itself (or the race of a seller's employ-
ees). This failure to test is unjustified." But see Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: a Market
Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000) (applying antitrust principles to
theories of discrimination in law school markets).
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caused in part by the anticompetitive nature of the market itself. There-
fore, the goals of this Article are twofold: (1) to move further toward
engaging antitrust scholarship with the empirical analysis of market-based
racial inequities, and (2) to highlight an underdeveloped area of legal
study-solving the harms resulting from markets where race plays an im-
portant, but difficult, to identify role in shaping market outcomes.
A brief few words on what this Article does not do. In any attempt
to frame questions of racial bias within existing legal regimes, it is com-
mon to wrestle with core frameworks. For instance, one might explore
the role of constitutional law or Title VII in providing a "solution." This
Article does not attempt this for a number of reasons detailed later, but
which bear mention here. First, as the racial skewing studied here is relat-
ed to a product, not a person, the Title VII regime is simply not a useful
framework. Second, as the article is not (directly) concerned with em-
ployment or labor practices, it makes little sense to retread familiar
ground. Finally, with respect to issues of casting and hiring and remedies
that might result from racial discrimination, definitive and innovative so-
lutions have been framed; the question has been much more thoroughly
explored than is appropriate for the top-down analysis presented here.'
When studying racial bias at the market-wide level, divorced from
the framework of employment discrimination and related laws, the legal
harm is a vexing question that must be addressed. In a traditional employ-
er/employee dispute, a racially-biased outcome might occur when an
individual suffers some sort of adverse job or labor action connected to
his or her race. That action is a race-based harm that can be easily
identified, but perhaps less easily proven. However, when studying
racially-biased markets and industries, how might one assess who is
harmed by racially biased or stratified outcomes? For this Article's purpos-
es, if we imagine a "film" as a product, the "owners" of that product are
primarily financiers, producers, and (often) production houses and studios.
Thus, when that product suffers from some sort of racial bias in the mar-
ketplace, those owners suffer from a legal harm that antitrust law might be
used to remedy.
This Article proceeds as follows: First, I sketch an approach to study-
ing the nexus between antitrust law, racially skewed outcomes, and
market-wide inefficiencies. Next, I trace the historical development of the
Hollywood production and distribution system, with an eye toward the
4. See, e.g., Russell Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CAL. L. REv 1 (2007). Robinson focuses on race-bias in the
casting process, whereas this Article's focus is on the film distribution market as a whole.
Consequently, though I do not dispute that such a hiring bias may exist, it shall not be
discussed at length here.
5. Though it is true, secondarily, that actors and others who helped to create the
product also suffer a harm, this Article focuses on the direct harm to those who own the
product.
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role that a lack of competition might play in structuring racially stratified
outcomes. Then, I turn toward the modern pre-video-on-demand (pre-
VOD) era; specifically, I explore the contextual role that race played in
feature film distribution during the 1990s prior to the national rollout of
services like Netflix. To complement this contextual analysis, I gathered a
dataset of demographic information pertaining to a wide variety of films
distributed for general release during the 1990s. Through econometric
modeling of race, distribution, and outcomes data, I attempt to determine
whether a racially skewed outcome is being caused by non-competitive
market forces. The data shows that race is indeed a driving force of dis-
tribution decisions and likely rooted primarily in a lack of competition.
However, such skewed outcomes must also be contextualized within a
prior history of explicit racial preferences and/or racial animus. How
might we solve this problem? I conclude by attempting to answer that
question; a comparison of traditional anti-discrimination remedies to
market and antitrust law solutions in this market suggests the latter are
more useful tools in the antidiscrimination toolbox.
The contextual and empirical analysis that follows reflects on a mar-
ket that, given its emphasis on publicly reported data-driven outcomes,
we may have previously assumed to be efficient. This assumption is false.
Therefore, as the Article moves from history through data analysis and
then to legal regimes designed to promote market competition, it ends
retrospectively asking whether antitrust-based legal solutions could have
been utilized to minimize racially skewed market outcomes. To fully un-
derstand the scope of the market problem, its impact over time, and the
failure of law as a solution, we now turn to contextual analysis of the in-
dustry's competitive morass over the last century.
I. FAux-COMPETITION: A BRuEF HISTORY OF HOLLYWOOD
Movie studios and their distribution arms are ideal candidates for an
empirical analysis of market-wide racial inefficiencies. In addition to their
freedom from most race and gender discrimination regulations,' there is
no federal or state agency with direct regulatory oversight over the sale
6. The data gathered herein includes a series of gender-related variables. Gender
(standing alone) is not fully discussed here except in contrast to race; the discussion of how
gender differs from race in this framework is the subject of future work.
7. My concerns in this Article focus on identifying harms in a market that is not
operating at maximum efficiency In a different article, one might solve for problems in
markets where such skewed outcomes are indeed efficient-at least with respect to reve-
nue or profit maximization.
8. But see, e.g., Robinson, supra note 4, at 29 (describing how traditional race-
related claims might be viable in certain contexts).
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and distribution of feature films.9 The only "regulator" that governs what
happens during the film distribution process is a voluntary and private
industry-created group: the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA). The MPAA, among other things, provides the ratings structure
for virtually all studio films released to theaters in the United States.10
Further, because of the relatively open reporting of film box-office results,
one can test theoretical and observational findings with a quantitative
analysis of measurable economic output. When market outputs are tested
in this fashion, one can determine, with some limitations, the extent to
which they are tainted by racial bias." But data analysis, absent contextual
analysis, is meaningless. Therefore, we shall first turn to the connection
between market history and racial inefficiency in Hollywood.
A. Anti-Competitive Beginnings
In contrast to recent times, the motion picture industry originally
developed and thrived amidst immense government regulation. 12 Thomas
Edison developed the first motion picture camera and player, and others
followed in pursuit. After a significant period of development, he and his
competitors agreed to pool their patents for cameras and projectors; they
formed the Motion Picture Patents Company (the MPPC).13 In 1910, the
MPPC created the General Film Company (GFC) in order to control the
distribution pipeline of films and to ensure that exhibitors who sought
popular films also used MPPC products." Fearing the growing
9. For an efficient discussion of the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC)
oversight of the radio and television industries, see Monroe E. Price, The Alarket for Loyal-
ties in the Electronic Media, in A COMMUNIcATIONS CORNUCOPIA 138, 148-49 (Roger G.
Noll & Monroe E. Price eds., 1998).
10. Major studio films are defined here as films produced or distributed by Holly-
wood based major studios that were released to a minimum of 500 theater screens. This
500-theater minimum accounts for the large majority of studio-produced films in a given
year. Major studios during the time period studied here, for distribution purposes, are
defined as: Disney/Miramax, MGM/Universal, 20th Century Fox, Warner Brothers/New
Line, Paramount, and Sony/Columbia. The study is limited to the United States because
only a small percentage of the films released to U.S. theaters are distributed to theaters
abroad, and only a small handful of those feature majority-minority casts. See Frequently
Asked Questions, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.mpaa.org/faq
(last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
11. This approach is an underutilized, but highly effective, method of examining
discrimination. See PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 1, at 404 ("[O]utcome tests can pro-
vide powerful evidence of when a particular kind of decisionmaking bias has an
unjustified disparate impact.").
12. See Tim Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH:TTHE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES,
54-55, 64-66 (2010).
13. SUZANNE MARY DONAHUE, AMERICAN FiLM DiSTRIBUTION: THE CHANGING MAR-
KETPLACE 10 (1987).
14. Id.
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dominance of the MPPC and the GFC, the lone remaining independent
distributor sued the MPPC and GFC, arguing that their growing domi-
nance violated federal antitrust law. The courts agreed, and ruled that the
MPPC had to dissolve.'" At this early stage, the anticompetitive nature of
the industry quickly caused government intervention. That intervention
in part, caused more robust competition in the market. 6
However, after the dissolution of the MPPC, studios that produced
movies sought to create another system of monopolistic control., When
audience demand for films stabilized, a three-branch industry developed
to supply the demand.'8 First, film producers, primarily studios, supplied
and manufactured films.19 Second, wholesale distributors brought those
films to theaters around the country.20 Finally, exhibitors served as the re-
tail outlet for those films. 2 1 Rather than focus on controlling the movie
making equipment, studios vertically integrated production, distribution,
and exhibition of films.2 2 Studios developed films with well-recognized
stars.23 Then, they developed distribution chains to help distribute their
stars' films. Finally, by merging with existing regional theater chains, they
then bought out the retail space where those films were exhibited.24 By
forming these vertically integrated corporations, studios could easily exer-
cise market dominance and prevent outside producers from successfully
entering the marketplace. By the end of the silent movie era in the late
1920s, five studios had control over each branch of the movie making
industry; Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Loew's-MGM, Warner Brothers,
and RKO dominated production, distribution, and exhibition. 25 This sec-
ond act of anti-competitive behavior led to a number of marketplace
inefficiencies and helped to facilitate other cartel-like behaviors, such as a
mandatory decency code.
Government intervention again proved critical to breaking up this
oligopoly. For much of the pre-war period, government regulators turned
a deaf ear to the tight coupling of production, distribution, and exhibi-
tion. As one account of the period reminds us, "when MGM released
Gone with the Wind in 1939, it was shown in MGM's theaters, staffed by
15. See United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
16. See Wu, supra note 12, at 61-73.
17. See MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 1 (1960).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 7-8.
24. Id. at 23-27.
25. Three additional minor studios brought the market total to eight players. These
three were Columbia and Universal, who produced and distributed films, and United Art-
ists, who distributed and exhibited films. See Id. at 23.
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MGM employees showing the public to their MGM-owned seats."2 Fi-
nally, after growing public resentment of the studios' monopolization of
content, distribution, and exhibition, the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ") filed a complaint against all eight studio/producer dis-
tributors, alleging that their practices unreasonably restrained trade in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and constituted a vertically inte-
grated system of production, distribution and, and exhibition. 27 However,
after heavy lobbying, the studios negotiated a settlement and consent de-
cree in November 1940 that effectively maintained the status quo.28 After
a number of years, government antitrust regulators found that the settle-
ment terms were not effective.29 In response, the federal government again
sought aggressive remedies by seeking the full relief requested in its origi-
nal complaint.30
The government's case and the lengthy trial that followed unfolded
through most of the 1940s ending (substantively, if not procedurally) in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.3 The Supreme Court's seven to one
decision in Paramount upheld much of the prior consent decree requiring
major changes to the ways movies were distributed to the public.32 The
Court found that antitrust remedies could include barring movie studios
from fixing prices when they licensed their films 33 and dissolution of vari-
ous "pooling" agreements in which theaters owned by different parties
were managed together.34 And while the district court previously found
that the five major movie studios at the time did not collectively have a
monopoly because they owned only about one-sixth of the country's the-
aters, the Supreme Court held that the other restraints of trade
engendered by the studios' conduct could still "effect a monopoly."3 Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision, the protracted court battle ended
with an aggressive plan of studio dis-integration. This forced the produc-
tion, distribution, and exhibition arms of each studio to compete with
26. Tom SHONE, BLOCKBUSTER: How HOLLYWOOD LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND
LOVE THE SUMMER 104-05 (2004).
27. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
See also 1 FRANK MANCHEL, FILM STUDY: AN ANALYTICAL BIOGRAPHY 640 (1990).
28. See, e.g., SHOW BUSINESS: Consent Decree, TIME, Nov. 11, 1940, at 70-71.
29. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 141 (1948).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id. at 143-44.
34. Id. at 149.
35. Id. at 167-71.
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one another.16 The case record, settlements, and subsequent court orders
became popularly known as the "Paramount Decrees." 7
Less than ten years later, each studio had separate production, exhi-
bition, and distribution channels. This ostensibly opened the market and
provided for vigorous free enterprise without the concomitant concerns
about excess corporate consolidation and power.3" Therefore, by the late
1950s, government intervention, regulation, and antitrust pressures had
already completely transformed the entire motion picture industry
twice.3 9 It is not clear that these antitrust actions had any beneficial effect
on consumers, and these actions did not have any race-specific compo-
nent. There were simply no major movies with the need for multiple
minority roles and very few speaking roles for ethnic minorities in
general.40 This lack of racial impact can certainly be attributed to many
factors, but it initially may suggest that for antitrust remedies to have a
positive impact on remedying market-wide discrimination or bias, there
must be members of race-minority groups ready and able to capitalize on
marketplace inefficiencies.
The gradual re-consolidation of the motion picture industry is be-
yond the scope of this Article. In short, as the marketplace shifted in the
period beginning after the late 1950s, studios slowly re-integrated distri-
bution of their products, while encouraging the development of large
chains of independent exhibitors. By the 1980s, the Reagan administra-
tion's strategic decision to step further back from antitrust enforcement
with respect to key Hollywood players allowed for the robust re-
emergence of studio-owned distribution arms and even a new era of
studio-owned theaters.4 1 Perhaps because of this hands-off approach to
market expansion and industry consolidation, studios and their distribu-
tion divisions maximized profits amidst a period of large-scale growth
within the film industry. However, this growth was not without its costs.
Despite the expansion of studios and their distribution networks, movies
featuring women, minorities, and themes associated with their experienc-
es simply were not frequently made or distributed widely.4 2 Although a
host of factors may have impacted this inefficiency, the high-level of sunk
costs required in such a fairly closed marketplace may be a significant
36. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 E Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y 1949).
37. Michael Conant, The Paramount Decrees Reconsidered, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss.
79, 80 (1981); see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), modified on recharging, 70 F. Supp 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, remanded, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
38. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 12, at 162-67.
39. See id.
40. See generally JESSE ALGERNON RHINEs, BLACK FILM/WHITE MONEY 7-13 (1996).
41. See Kraig G. Fox, Paramount Pictures Revisited: The Resurgence of Vertical Integration
in the Motion Picture Industry, 21 HoFsTRA L. REV. 505, 524 (1992).
42. See, e.g., RHINEs, supra note 40.
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contributor. In short, this history of anti-competitive forces operating
during the formation of the modern Hollywood era may have created a
path dependent model toward perpetually anticompetitive and racially
43disparate market outcomes.
B. Modern Distribution Regimes
By the 1990s, the major Hollywood studios were releasing record
numbers of films while distributing them to the widest number of thea-
ters possible. This shift in distribution and marketing strategies led to a
market where movies would be opened in 2,000-3,000 theaters to "be-
come commonplace."4 4
This Article's focus thus begins with the fully consolidated, modern
version of the industry, specifically the period between 1991 and 2000
("the 1990s"). The average movie during the 1990s was financed with
roughly $53.4 million, and films with big-name stars easily required $100
million with an additional $40 million in marketing expenses. Veterans
in the film industry estimated that major studio movies only earned a
profit of 5 percent after expenses, even including profits derived from
home video, international, and other markets.4 6 As the costs of developing,
promoting, and distributing films grew during the 1990s, studio execu-
tives likely sought to maximize profits and minimize costs-the
prototypical, neoclassic model of the firm. As major studios adopted free-
market, choice-oriented models of behavior, they began to-like a
political candidate-seek the "one-time vote" (the ticket bought by the
moviegoer).4 ' The rise in production and distribution of majority-
minority movies and the concomitant desire to match these
majority-minority wide-release films with the audience most likely to
"vote for" them would test whether this distribution model was actually
efficient and effective.
43. See generally Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of Q WERTY, 77 AM. EcoN.
REv. 332 (1985).
44. Peter Passell, As Cost of Movie-Making Rises, Hollywood Bets it All on Openings,
STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St.Paul), December 29, 1997, at D4.
45. Josh Chetwynd, Lights, Camera, Money?, USA TODAY, March 8, 1999.
46. Paul Farhi, Taming Movies' Titanic Costs, WASH. PosT, Mar. 13, 1999, at El (quot-
ing veteran film producer Tom Pollock).
47. Randall Rothenberg, Advertising: Movie Promoters Adopting Modern Marketing
Skills, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 23, 1990, at D16; see also ANTHoNY DowNs, AN EcoNoMic THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
48. Hereinafter, I use the phrase "majority-minority" to indicate only those movies
that had a majority of the speaking cast as members of ethnic minority groups. Therefore,
the all-minority mainstream comedy BOOMERANG (Paramount Pictures 1992) is majority-
minority, but the Denzel Washington thriller PELICAN BRIEF (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993)
is not considered majority-minority. When I say "woman-led," I mean that the movie stars
a woman in a leading role. Thus, the comedy THERE'S SOMETHING ABOUT MARY (20th
FALL 2012] 9
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In order to best study this model, it makes the most sense to exam-
ine the process of a feature-film's first-run theater distribution. The initial
distribution of a film is uniquely tied to studio profit since most revenues
early in a film's box-office performance revert to studios and/or distribu-
tors, not theaters. As one analyst demonstrates, "under that arrangement it
is clearly in the studios' interest to earn as much of the gross in the open-
ing weekend as possible." 4 9 If films are distributed in an economically
inefficient manner by race, the unique effect of first-week consumer de-
mand further artificially depresses a film's actual earning potential. As it
stands, distributors and studios solicit individual theaters and chains with
target proposals for exhibition contracts for all movies."o These proposals
emphasize the studios'or distributors' insider knowledge about a film's
potential success in each theater's market.' Then, within a highly con-
strained choice set, distributors arrange exhibition contracts to maximze
their expected return on their products.52 Despite this rational calculus,
the system's major players failed to take advantage of economically effi-
cient opportunities to serve hungry audiences consistently throughout the
1990s."
Lack of healthy competition and a one-size-fits-all model might be
expected to lead to this sort of racial impasse, as distribution calculations
historically focused exclusively on non-minority films. For films to pro-
duce the most profit, "the economics of marketing powerfully favor
nationwide openings in thousands of theaters over the traditional 'plat-
forming' approach."54 Having a film open on the widest number of
screens has always been perceived as critical for a film's long-term reve-
nues because the opening weekend box-office figures have become "the
fulcrum for selling everything from videos to foreign distribution to toys
and popcorn."'5 Even large theater chains recognize that when a movie
Century Fox Film Corp. 1998) is woman-led, but the action-filled ARMAGEDDON (Touch-
stone Pictures 1998) is not.
49. Rick Lyman, Even Blockbusters Find Fame Fleeting In a Multiplex Age, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2001, at Al 2.
50. HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY EcoNoMics 127-31 (8th ed.
2011).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. As shall be explained, the distribution of films may be characterized by an irra-
tional racial bias based upon whether the movie partially or predominantly features
minority actors. In a fully competitive market, racial bias would have no logical effect on
market strategy. After all, according to free market theorists, if the studios were indeed
discriminating in film distribution practices, they would be punished by the market-and
then perish.
54. Passell, supra note 44, at D4. Platforming is a strategy where a film is opened in a
smaller number of markets, generates positive buzz/acclaim, and then is gradually rolled
out to an increasing number of theaters/markets.
55. Id.
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secures a first place finish during its opening weekend it "pays dividends
long after the movie leaves the theaters."'5 6 This formula has historically
appeared to be true for all films, regardless of the race and gender of the
cast.57 In the period studied here, a massive build-out in multiplexes led to
greater screen capacity-for all types of films-creating what some
termed a "glut in theater capacity."-" This glut led some theaters to "strain
to fill auditoriums" with many Hollywood releases, 9 except those with
minority casts.
As shall be discussed in Part II below, theaters showing movies with
predominantly minority actors were much more likely to be filled to ca-
pacity. 0 The problem is not really in the supply of movies, as independent
filmmakers produced almost 54 percent of the total yearly amount of
films by the end of the 1990s. Instead, the distribution problem is one of
access, control, and overall market domination by the largest firms; in anti-
trust matters, this can be measured by the market-concentration number
created using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). As one antitrust
challenge describes, "sufficiently large HHI figures establish the FTC's
prima facie case that a merger is anti-competitive."6 1 In the 1990s, studio
produced and distributed films were 98 percent of the content and 90
percent of the box-office revenues, and the HHI of the top eight distribu-
tors during this period was between 1200 and 1550, which could by
some measurements be seen as just slightly moderately concentrated un-
der DOJ's traditional HHI analysis (assuming a nationwide market for
distribution). However, if distribution markets are regionally concentrated
56. Id.
57. A prominent article on the box-office outcomes for majority-minority movies
encouraged movie audiences to buy tickets "especially on their opening weekend."
Dwight Brown, Hollywood Sees Green in the Mosaic of Black Life, EMERGE, Nov. 1998, at 224,
226.
58. Passell, supra note 44, at D4.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Media Circus: If it's Wednesday, A Black Filn Must Be
Opening, SALON.COM (Aug. 13, 1997, 3:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/1997/08/13/
media_219/ (discussing the trend of opening "Black" movies on Wednesdays to relieve
overcrowding at the limited number of theaters).
61. See, e.g., FTC v. Heinz, 246 E3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001). DOJ uses the Her-
findahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) when evaluating the change in market shares on the
competitive effects of a merger. The HHI is calculated by sununing the squares of individ-
ual firms' market shares, and thus gives proportionately greater weight to larger market
shares. For example a market with 5 large firms with market shares of 25%, 25%, 25%,
15%, and 10% whould have an HHI of 2200. Under DOJ Guidelines during this period,
an unconcentrated market had an HHI below 1500, moderately concentrated markets had
an HHI between 1500 and 2500, and highly concentrated markets had an HHI above
2500.
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instead of perfectly nationally distributed, the HHI for that market could
be substantially higher.62
Finally, given the measurement inefficiencies and uncertainty re-
garding products with no revenue/demand precedent during this period,
if demand was inaccurately advance-gauged, the effect of such inaccuracy
would be most strongly felt for those products that were coming from
outside the traditional studio system or those products for which demand
measurements were particularly inaccurate (such as majority-minority
films).
C. The "Business" and "Science" of Efficient Distribution63
The process of distributing a film consists of essentially three players:
the studio/group that produced the movie, the distribution company, and
movie theaters.64 When a film is complete, studios typically send copies of
the film to distributors for their consideration.6 Distributors analyze
known variables like cast, director, script, target demographic, rating, and
running time to determine a potential profit margin and consider wheth-
er to bid on distribution rights. Once all distributors have responded to
the studio's request, they will then offer to either rent the rights outright
or share the film profits with the studio.
The balance between renting and buying also relies on rough esti-
mates, gut instinct, and the search for comparable "metrics" of movies that
61
seem similar. In a rental agreement, distributors obtain licenses to dis-
tribute after paying a flat fee negotiated with the studio." The risk/reward
scenario in rental arrangements is squarely on the distributor, since the
studio is fully paid for the product and the secondary profit/returns are all
left in the distributor's hands.o In contrast, a sharing arrangement essen-
tially creates a partnership between studio and distributor: the distributors
get to keep a portion of the returns in exchange for distribution rights.
This method of distribution is "safer" for both sides, but it is potentially
72less lucrative for studios. Over time, studios have also created their own
62. See generally, Barry R. Litman, Motion Picture Entertainment, in THE STRUCTURE
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 177 (Walter Adams & James Brock, eds., 10th ed. 2001).
63. The discussion in this section relies generally on the insights of industry insiders
and HaroldVogel. VOGEL, supra note 50, at 72-82.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 75.
66. Id. at 76-82.
67. Id. at 77.
68. Id. at 76-80.
69. Id. at 77.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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distribution arms, but keeping films entirely in-house shifts the financial
risk back to the company itself.3
The next phases of distribution also involve rough data estimates by
distributors and risk analysis by theaters. Distributors have to determine
how many prints to make, and where the movie will be most successful.
Because each print's cost was roughly $1,500-$2,000 during the 1990s, a
wide-release movie could cost $6 million-at a minimum-just for dis-
tribution. After gauging metrics of their own, distributors then negotiate
with theaters, and again the model becomes one of risk versus reward. 5
Theaters can either pay a distributor a flat fee in exchange for the free
rights to exhibit a film for a minimum period, or they can enter into a
cost-sharing agreement where they agree to give the distributor a portion
of the movie's box-office revenue. In this latter model, distributors have
the upper-hand on theaters: the terms of their "percentage" arrangements
typically allow for distributors to set tight percentage retentions and to get
the higher of net or gross box-office returns. During the 1990s, con-
sistent with a model of minimal competition, theater exhibitors in given
regions often agreed not to competitively bid-up prices on certain films.
Instead, they chose to divide up those limited sure-fire hits equally among
themselves to ensure that pure-market forces would be minimized.8
Although it is reasonable to expect that the business of distribution
is mechanized and routinized by a dizzying array of statistical data and
advance formal modeling, this is not the case. It would also be wrong if
one might have thought that distribution decisions were initially linked to
audience demand. The lack of ex-ante demand measurements has long
hampered forecasting and pre-release models of major studios, academics,
and industry analysts.7 9 The Economist, when surveying the history of stu-
dio efforts to predict box-office hits, concluded that despite decades of
tinkering with models and measurements, "[n]one has worked well."'o
During the 1990s, a few companies attempted to fill this void but with
mixed results. Predicting audience response to consumer products is cer-
tainly difficult, especially for a unique good like a feature film. In the
1990s, interested parties attempted to find demand-based solutions but
were not particularly successful.These inaccurate metrics caused a certain
amount of mis-prediction with respect to demand (and thus the scope of
distribution).
73. Id. at 38-39.
74. See id. at 123.
75. Id. at 77.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Fox, supra note 41, at 533.
79. See Terminator 9:You'll Love It, EcoNoMIsT,July 4, 1992, at 97.
80. Id.
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During the 1990s, the National Research Group (NRG), a division
of A.C. Nielsen, conducted small-scale consumer surveys to create a
"tracking score."" The score is essentially a percentage of survey respond-
ents who indicate that a particular movie identified by the survey taker is
the one they most want to see. Given this relatively simple measurement,
it is not surprising that virtually all pre-release movies scored within the
same rough proximity on the NRG's typical survey. Even movies with the
highest consumer recognition registered with less than 25 percent of the
sampled public. Despite this level of imperfect information, the NRG
survey was typically used to gauge the hypothetical performance of a
small group of wide-releases that received copious amounts of advance
release exposure.8 2 The weakness of this model even extended to block-
buster films. For example, NRG predicted an opening of $28-31 million
for X-Men, which was quite different from its $54.5 million opening
weekend. 3 Whether for lofty or awkward reasons, NRG did not release
or discuss its models, surveys, or methodologies.8 ' This prevented both
industry and academic scrutiny of particular results.
Alternative methods of tracking viewer interest were typically de-
rived from week-of-release sources. In other words, studios gauged
demand from post-distribution sales or search data. For example, during
the 1990s, Moviefone, the telephone/internet service that enables con-
sumers to find which movies are playing in their neighborhood, had an
extensive database that tracked each consumer-initiated search. By mining
the data during the first week of a film's release, Moviefone's corporate
subscribers (primarily industry analysts) could fairly accurately gauge con-
sumer interest and demand-often organized in relatively discrete
community-level data.' Alternatively, during this period, Cinemascore
conducted exit polling during a movie's first week of release."6 In short,
Cinemascore asked audiences to rate movies on a familiar letter grade
scale. Those responses were then popularly distributed to industry insiders
and publications. Cinemascore also collected key demographic infor-
mation that is used to further analyze individual level responses.
Nonetheless, it is widely known that despite the use of occasional test
screenings and polls, movie studios have never used anything "as intense
81. See Terry Lawson, 'Lost World' Opening: Not a Question of Big, but How Big,
KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, May 23, 1997.
82. See John Lippman & Bruce Orwall, Box Oice Befuddlement: How Will Films Fare
From Week to Week?-Accuracy of Tracking Surveys Gets A Few Thumbs Down; Misjudging
'Chicken Run,' WALL ST.J., July 21, 2000, at B1.
83. Id.
84. Sreenath Sreenivasan, Wiat is a Hit Film? Moviefone May Know, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 1997, at D9.
85. Id.
86. Fred Zufryden, New Film Website Promotion and Box-Office Performance, 40 J. AD-
VERTISING REs. 55, 57 (2000).
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or precisely calibrated as the sampling devices some toothpaste and cereal
companies employ."7 And the industry never rallied behind a key standard
or set of parameters for predicting a movie's profitability despite large pre-
release investments.88
Given the absence of robust pre-release demand information (then
and now), the impact of market inefficiencies is clearer. There has simply
never been an accepted industry standard to determine the scope of a
film's distribution beyond the relatively simplistic metrics described above
and simple comparisons to a previous movie of its type (e.g., Star Trek to
Star Wars or Batman to Superman). Academics and economists have aggres-
sively pursued a pre-release standard metric but have found that "attempts
to predict revenue patterns without any sales data meet with limited suc-
cess."89 In other words, prior to the release of most films (and certainly
during the 1990s), the film industry and its distributors often do not
know how well a film will do at the box office or what its optimal level
of distribution might be. In the weeks preceding a tent-pole general re-
lease, studios use marketing research from limited test screenings to
develop awareness of the public's response to "advertising themes, trailers,
posters, and other promotional materials, [which] helps devise effective
campaigns geared toward a film's potential audience."'o However, without
clear standards or objective data-driven models until very late in the pro-
duction/distribution equation, studios are more vulnerable to unreliable
information-particularly in film projects that are tied to race or minority
actors. So what of the role of racial equality in such an uncertain market
environment? Might this lack of standard lead to race-based market ineffi-
ciencies if such efficiencies are exacerbated in markets that lack strong
competition?
Seizing on the absence of real data and the temptation to fill the
void with racial conjecture, critics of the studios' demand-side arguments
argued that distributors and studios themselves were substituting their
own theories of demand and telling filmmakers "to make hood movies or
nothing."9 ' If demand could not be accurately measured and caused inef-
ficiencies in distribution, then such inefficiencies would also tighten
production markets. At least anecdotally, this seems to be true. For much
of the 1990s, African-American actors and filmmakers found themselves
"frustrated by studio executives who seem reluctant to embrace films that
87. Jay Mathews, The Foolproof Film Forecast Formula, WASH. POST, June 12, 1994, at
G5.
88. See, e.g., Torn King, Jim Carrey's 'Majestic' Failure-$90 Million Mistake Alienated
Young and Old Alike With Its Miscast Comic, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at W4.
89. Jehoshua Eliashbert & Mohanbir S. Sawhey, A Parsimonious Model for Forecasting
Gross Box-Office Revenues ofMotion Pictures, 15 MARKETING SCI. 113, 113 (1996).
90. Martine Danan, Marketing the Hollywood Blockbuster in France, 23 J. PoPuLAR FILM
&TELEVISION 131, 135 (1995).
91. Esther Iverem, Black But Not Beautiful, NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1993.
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explore other facets of the black experience outside of life on the
streets."92 These failures to achieve sustained growth of the market for di-
verse films led by African-American actors prompted one well-known
magazine to charge that "when African-Americans [actors and actresses]
come knocking on Hollywood's door, the response is still 'Whites on-
ly.' "93 There is no reliable market-wide data to back up the quiet idea that
Whites simply avoid certain movies because the actors are predominantly
racial minorities. 94 Market research indicates that African-Americans are
only 13 percent of the population but 25 percent of the market for com-
mercial films.95  Yet, throughout the 1990s, films that feature
African-American actors were underdistributed to all audiences, regardless
of the audience's color or the movie's topic. The data-analysis presented
later suggests that this history of excluding or limiting African-American
opportunity in the industry stems from its lack of competition.
D. Majority-Minority Films
From its early beginnings as a tightly controlled oligopoly, the Hol-
lywood studio system did not produce enough films to satisfy diverse
tastes.96 Indeed, these historically market-inefficient, production-side ine-
qualities may be a significant contributor to the level of disparate
participation by women and ethnic minorities in the filmmaking pre-
sent. Pure efficiency cannot be expected in any market. And by their
very structure, oligopolistic industries are, to some degree, inefficient." In
Hollywood, that inefficiency is particularly intransigent with respect to
race.
92. Thomas R. King, Cut!: Hollywood's Budget-mindedness Sets Black Filmmakers Back
Again, WALL ST.J., Feb. 19,1993, at R12.
93. Pam Lambert et. al., What's Wrong With This Picture? Exclusion of Minorities Has
Become a Way of Life In Hollywood, PEOPLE MAG., Mar. 18, 1996, at 44 (discussing the exclu-
sion of minorities from all but one category of the 1996 Academy awards).
94. It is frequently true that when I refer to majority-minority movies or minority
actors, they are African-American. Regretfully, studio films led by Latino or Asian-
American actors are so rare that they cannot be analyzed as separate subgroups within the
dataset developed for this Article. With respect to consumer surveys and experiments, they
have been few and far between. The most promising studies substantially post-date the
period of this study.
95. Donna Bailey Nurse, A Tale of Two Ships Launched in Hollywood, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Mar. 27, 1998, at D3.
96. An early influential analysis of this type of marketplace discrimination can be
found in Peter 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition
in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. OF EcoNoMics 194 (1952).
97. Although his work focuses more generally on a comprehensive historical ap-
proach to participation and inclusion in all aspects of Hollywood filmmaking, Jesse A.
Rhines offers an interesting critique of the discriminatory effects of flawed distribution
practices. See Rhines, supra note 40, at 7-13.
98. See, e.g., Roithmayr, supra note 3.
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This race inefficiency was, at least initially, caused in part by old-
fashioned racism. This racism was typified by Jack Warner who once said,
"I don't want no niggers on this lot."99 Although Hollywood studios have
long lacked market ingenuity in areas of diversity, the distribution prob-
lem did not play nearly as large a negative net-economic role in previous
generations. This is simply because throughout much of the twentieth
century, Hollywood studios failed to produce one general release film
featuring a majority of minorities in starring roles.Through formal segre-
gation and with some creative ingenuity, Black filmmakers, such as
Spencer Williams and Oscar Michaux, independently developed and dis-
tributed all-Black movies to receptive audiences in all-Black theaters.m
However, after the break-through of Sidney Portier and the "black exploi-
tation" (later "blaxploitation") fad that swept through American theaters
in the early 1970s,"o' Blacks in Hollywood had little hope that filnmaking
opportunities would advance beyond roles in stories filled with
hyperbolic sex and violence, and usually directed by Whites.102 Although a
well-developed film like Supefly actually led the box-office rankings and
grossed $11 million in its first two months of release, studios' reliance on
recycling slightly different versions of that movie's central premise eventu-
ally led to a decline in popularity and box-office performance.10 Further,
while the 1970s and 1980s led to an opening of opportunities for Afri-
can-Americans in political and corporate sectors, industry insiders seemed
to agree that the movement for inclusion failed to reach Hollywood until
the middle of the 1990s.104 Thus, during the period of study in this Article
(1990-2000), it was not initially clear that any forces-external or
internal-would cause both the production and distribution channel
inefficiencies to change.
Despite such pessimism, an assessment of opportunities for African-
Americans in Hollywood early in the 1990s argued in favor of the
rational firm approach. Most industry insiders agreed that "the problem is
more a question of money than racism. In other words, as long as films
made by and for Blacks earn money, Hollywood will continue to finance
99. As quoted in JAMES SALUS, CHESTER HIMEs: A LIFE 56 (2001). Himes was an
African-American writer (of crime novels, primarily) whose attempts to break into Hol-
lywood were resoundingly unsuccessful.
100. David Sterritt, Blacks in the Mainstream, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONIToR,July 2, 1990.
101. See, e.g., Show Business: Black Market, TIME, Apr. 10, 1972.
102. See id. Further, although Black filmmakers such as Michael Schultz and Gordon
Parks Sr. and Jr. did reach wider audiences in mainstream films, they were "eventually
squeezed out of major status by White-dominated market and studio forces."
103. ANDREW J. RAUSCH, TURNING POINTS IN FILM HISTORY 189 (2004); see Richard
Maynard, The Birth and Demise of the 'Blaxploitation' Genre, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2000),
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/16/entertainment/ca- 4 1409.
104. V Dion Haynes, Call To Empowerment: Many Think It's Time to Get Serious About a
Black Film Industry, CHI.TRIB., Oct. 20, 1996.
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them."'o Moreover, the optimism fueled by the 1980s success of Eddie
Murphy and successful (yet budget-conscious) releases by Spike Lee,
Robert Townsend, and Keenan Ivory Wayans, suggested that, as one article
noted, "a new wave of films may at last win wider acceptance for minori-
ty themes., 0o The promised opportunities and developments did not
exactly come to pass as the 1990s unfolded.
Developments throughout the 1990s are far too numerous-and
predictable-to be discussed at length here. Simply put, as individual
movies with majority-minority casts (such as NewJack City, Boyz N the
Hood, Menace II Society, Malcolm X, Poetic justice, Waiting to Exhale, and
countless others) entered the distribution channel, they did so at rates that
were seemingly uncorrelated with their market demand. For example,
Boyz N the Hood debuted with a box-office average per-theater higher
than Terminator 2. 17 Ironically, studio failure to adequately predict demand
and a strong miscalculation in distribution led to violence at a Los Ange-
les venue where the over-capacity theater was forced to turn away
opening-night ticket holders, along with those who sought to buy tickets
to the sold out showings of New Jack City."8 The melee occurred only
after the theater sold out for the evening but failed to tell the patrons who
were still waiting in line for several hours." Studio executives noticed
that the crush of demand for new release "Black" movies, particularly on
Friday, resulted in sold-out shows, moviegoers being turned away, and the
potential for violence as a result of this overcrowding.,no A rational re-
sponse to this crush of demand might have been to more widely
distribute such pictures. However, this would have been particularly hard
to do during the 1990s given the narrow number of distributors and their
reliance on the same potentially inefficient distribution models.
105. Likewise, Morgan Freeman echoed this assessment by noting that Hollywood
was not "locked anymore on color ... they're looking for the bucks." Joe DeChick, Black
Actors Want to Build on Recent Gains in Hollywood, CINCINNATI INQUIRER, Feb. 16, 1990, at
E1, E6.
106. The successful, low-budget HOLLYWOOD SHUFFLE (Conquering Unicorn 1987)
(by Townsend) and I'm GONNA GET You SucKA! (Front Films 1988) (by Wayans)
performed profitably on a small scale in 1989. The summer of 1989 brought Lee's memo-
rable Do THE RIGHT THING (40 Acres & A Mule Filmworks 1989). And, though not
dealing with a predominantly minority cast or theme, Denzel Washington's turn in GLORY
(Tristar Pictures 1989) and Morgan Freeman's role in DRIVING Miss DAISY (The Zanuck
Company 1989) suggested that Hollywood studios were warming to the idea of rethink-
ing their traditional reticence to think creatively with regard to African-American actors
and directors. See, e.g., Sterritt, supra note 100.
107. John Leland with Donna Foote, A Bad Omen for Black Movies, NEWSWEEK, July
29, 1991, at 48.
108. See Roger D. Scott, Looting:A Proposal to Enhance the Sanction ForAggravated Prop-
erty Crime, 11 J. L. & POL. 129, 185 (1996).
109. David J. Fox, Booking Films:A Thorny Issue for Theaters, L.A.TIMES,Aug. 5, 1993.
110. Robert Butler, Why 'Friday' Opened on Wednesday, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,June
2,1995.
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E. Preference Externalities, Demand Metrics, and Distribution
The distribution problem for films with predominantly minority
casts is unique, in part, because a wide distribution of films is dependent
upon perceived market demand and potential revenues from theater exhi-
bition. If it is perceived that the potential film audience will be narrow
and/or small, distribution decisions will result in an initial narrowing of
the marketplace to maximize yield in targeted markets. Marketing then
helps to maintain and create demand. Yet studios create market demand
through marketing efforts that often bungle movies with predominantly
minority actors."' Therefore, for these "minority" films, marketing and
public perception matter a great deal in explaining why these movies'
performance is not maximized at the box office. Analysts have also sug-
gested that while mainstream films with popular stars can survive negative
reviews, films by and about African-Americans are said to be especially
sensitive to negative reviews." 2 This might be attributed to a number of
factors. First, some critics cite the low marketing budgets of majority-
minority films, suggesting that audiences who are not incentivized to
become familiar with a new movie (product) simply won't buy a ticket if
a well-known box-office leading actor is not involved.'"3 Others target the
non-minority executives who decide how to market or distribute films.
They criticize that such executives do not understand how to translate
"minority issues" into broader themes accessible to a wide variety of au-
diences."' As one such example, the filmmakers who created the 1993 hit
Menace II Society strongly objected to the distributor's active efforts to
change marketing materials during the film's release. The distributor's re-
sponse was that it wanted to "broaden the film's appeal . .. and attract
crossover business.""' However, New Line Cinemas's first audience study
of Menace II Society suggested that the movie's opening audience was a
highly skewed demographic-98 percent African-American teenagers.
111. One executive survey indicated that Disney, Universal, Fox, MGM, Paramount,
and Warner Brothers had no African-Americans in vice president or higher positions.
MGM, Paramount, Universal, and Warner Brothers had no minority vice presidents at all.
At the time, only Sony Pictures (through Columbia) had African-American leadership.
Perhaps not coincidentally, Columbia's vice president helped to develop the commercially
successful Bovz N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures 1991). See Robert WWelkos, Against the
Odds, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992.
112. Terry Pristin, Why Audiences Failed to Do 'Justice", L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1993.
(quoting Steve Nicolaides, co-producer of Bovz N THE HOOD and POETIC JUSTICE
(Columbia Pictures Corp. 1993)). In a well-cited incident, Los Angeles Times movie critic
Kenneth Turan gave Eddie Murphy's largely minority comedy BOOMERANG (Paramount
Pictures 1992) a negative review, citing its majority casting of blacks as professionals "silly
and arbitrary:" Iverem, supra note 91.
113. Pristin, supra note 112.
114. Id.
115. Claudia Eller, Taking the "Menace" Out ofAd, Poster, L.A. TIMES,July 22, 1993.
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Studio executives promoting the admittedly gritty movie struggled to
broaden the movie's audience until finally generating an audience that
was 25 percent White, suggesting that wider distribution and a larger au-
dience were attainable with a thoughtful and more universal marketing
approach."'6 As typified by the problems with Menace II Society, marketing
and distribution problems can also partially be explained if one believes
that movie audiences have very little overlap in their preference for mov-
ies and that such preferences are highly tied to race (specifically, the race
of characters in a movie). In other words, if African-Americans and
Whites have no movie preferences in common, these "preference exter-
nalities" might make some of the decisions discussed in this Article seem
more efficient."7 There is little solid data that this is the case.
Further, marketing the same film to multiple target audiences in this
era wasn't terribly difficult, due to the 1990s expansion of cable and tele-
vision network television shows. Yet, it was apparently no secret that
Hollywood studios would "frequently hamstring [majority-minority] pro-
jects by failing to allot them the funds necessary to reach beyond
traditional African-American markets.""' When they did make such an
effort, often the biggest problem for studios was making the lead actors
appear less violent."" Hollywood studios also apparently ignored Nielsen
ratings data that indicated strong, similar tastes for both Blacks and Whites
in the highly coveted young adult audience. Indeed, of their top twenty
favorite television shows during the middle of the 1990s, Black and White
Americans aged twelve to seventeen had eleven identical picks. 120 Despite
these commonalties, New Line Cinemas, Disney, and MGM relied on a
consulting agency whose president argued that young, urban Black teens
want their humor "raw and R-rated" and will go to see a movie if "they
116. Id.
117. For example, see Joel Waldfogel & Peter Siegelman, Race and Radio: Preference
Externalities, Minority Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, 10 ADVANcES
IN APPLIED MiCROECONOMIcs 73 (2001), which argues that in the market for radio, the
different programming preferences of audiences can be differentiated by race. As such,
these "preference externalities" tend to make race-free decision making difficult. This ap-
proach might succeed in radio, which relies on advertiser differences for its revenues.
Advertisers can pay less for minority listeners, because these listeners listen more and tend
to buy less. However, these preference externalities should not be expected in film, where
studio revenues are not derived from an audience intermediary that values audience dol-
lars differently
118. Nurse, supra note 95.
119. During 1991 and 1992, there were a number of fascinating incidents in which
studios removed firearms from the movie posters for the majority-minority JUICE (Island
World 1992), while leaving them prominently featured in ads for the Christian Slater ve-
hicle, KuFFs (Dino de Laurentiis Communications 1992). See, e.g., Jim Emerson, Violence
Strikes a Nerve in Black Action Films, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (California), Jan. 26, 1992.
120. The data were analyzed by BBDO New York and reported in Christy Fisher,
Black, Hip, and Primed (to Shop), AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept. 1, 1996, at 58.
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think the soundtrack is good and the beat is there."1 21 With marketing
experts like these, it's no wonder that marketing and distribution problems
plagued Hollywood studios.
Thus, even with the success of films starring both popular and
not-yet-discovered minority actors, the production and distribution of
majority-minority films still seemed to underserve market demands and
dampen industry profit potential. The successes of movies like Waiting to
Exhale and Soul Food were rebutted by industry comments regarding the
barely profitable vehicles The Preacher's Wife and How Stella Got Her Groove
Back. Even the aforementioned executive at Fox, which distributed the
$70 million grossing Waiting to Exhale, argued that they "spent weeks and
weeks trying to get middle White America to buy into this film. We never
succeeded."1 22 Interestingly, this marketing executive was also in charge of
the universally panned marketing strategy for the critically praised but
box-office underperforming Warren Beatty movie, Bulworth. 12 Yet, even
movie experiments like Bulworth do not entail significant financial risks
for studios. Bulworth and the slightly profitable How Stella Got Her Groove
Back were both produced for "well below the industry average."1 24
Based upon these observations, it certainly might appear that no
matter what the content of the movie, major Hollywood studio films
with a majority of minority actors were consistently marketed and de-
ployed on very few screens nationwide due to a perceived lack of
demand. Likewise, it appears at first glance that no matter what the sub-
ject, rating, or critical review, major studio movies not featuring a
majority of minority actors were consistently distributed to a wider array
of theaters. To more aggressively test these observations, we turn to em-
pirical analysis.
121. Fred Pampel et al., Marketing the Movies, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1, 1994, at 48
(quoting Ivan Juzang, president of Philadelphia-based Motivational Education Entertain-
ment Productions). I worry about what part of his message is "motivational."
122. Kim Masters & Jacqueline Trescott, Why Hollywood Keeps Blacks Waiting, WAsH.
POST, Mar. 24, 1996, at G6 (quoting Tom Sherak, Senior Vice President of 20th Century
Fox and lead marketer for WAITING To EXHALE (20th Century Fox 1995)).
123. BULWORTH (20th Century Fox 1998) was a sophisticated political satire, but it
also featured a popular rap music soundtrack and was set in Los Angeles, and one reviewer
suggested that the film's audience would be "young, urban males, specifically the young
African-American audience." However, the executive who led the WAITING To EXHALE
(20th Century Fox 1995) campaign was also in charge of BULWORTH, and he argued that
BULWORTH would be most successful with "guys" and "older females." It wasn't successful,
apparently, with either group. But, the movie received a 1999 Academy Award nomination
for Best Original Screenplay, which suggests that its content had wide and original appeal.
See, e.g., Richard Natale, The Conpetition Is Only on the Surface, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1998, at
Fl.
124. Richard Natale, More Losers Than Winners in Box-Office Tally, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8,
1998, at D1.
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II.THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FILM DIsTuUTION
The contextual evidence that I have described thus far suggests that
race played a strong and independent role in influencing film distributors'
behavior during the 1990s. However, when one gathers data to explore
the science of distribution, the question remains: is any evidence of racial
skewing nonetheless efficient? This Article cannot definitively answer that
question, but it sets out a model of distribution, with the best available
evidence, which broadly challenges assumptions about marketplace effi-
ciency and its connection to racially disparate outcomes.
A. Previous Studies and Industry Models
Because the process has historically been characterized by a dearth
of rigorous information modeling, a few academics and others attempted
to develop something of a post-hoc science for predicting distribution
and-more often-box-office success. Those models and the ones in this
Article are influenced by traditional studies of product sales, consumer
preferences, and product quality; they have been designed to reflect
familiar studies that focus on aggregate consumer marketplace demand
and "take the form of [OLS] multivariate regression models in which
demand for a vector of products is related to marketing variables such as
prices, displays, and various forms of advertising."25 That approach is taken
here, though with the uncertainty of demand reflected by the lack of a
direct measurement. 126 Box-office forecasting models take this basic mar-
keting study approach, but studios and academics adapt that model of
choice to reflect the peculiarities of Hollywood filmmaking and distribu-
tion. 127 The most notable difference between general consumer product
models and those for film is a reliance on product and environmental fac-
tors of films to predict sales and profits, as opposed to demand-which is
widely used in traditional consumer products research.128 This is so, in part,
because the pattern and life-cycle of a film's release and box-office results
is the exact opposite of the typical "bell-shaped life-cycle diffusion curve
pattern that has been described for durable products."1 29 Further, pricing
considerations, a central variable in much consumer research, appear to
125. Peter E. Rossi & Greg M. Allenby, Statistics and Marketing, 95 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N
635 (2000).
126. Demand, when needed here as a variable, is measured by using overall box-
office performance. This is, of course, a post hoc gauge of demand, which is precisely what
works best to determine whether demand is being accurately predicted at the outset.
127. Fred S. Zufryden, Linking Advertising to Box Office Performance of New Film Releas-
es-A Marketing Planning Model, 36J. ADVERT. REs. 29 (1996).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 16 (using OLS for some questions, and a logged dependent variable ridge
regression procedure when analyzing a bounded "intent to see" measure).
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play no role in movie attendance since prices at various theaters do not
substantially vary within a geographic region.
A variety of econometric models of various aspects of film business
outcomes provide a useful starting framework for the models that I create
and test here. In "Predicting Movie Grosses," Simonoff and Sparrow out-
line their preferred method for predicting a movie's net theater gate
receipts.1 3 They use a database of three hundred films from 1999 to calcu-
late potential grosses. Using only ten independent variables, Simonoff and
Sparrow employ an OLS model to derive their predictive model of a
film's total gross.1 Similarly, Fred Zufryden's work connects advertising
and the level of a film's distribution to gauge their impact on a film's
overall box-office performance. Zufryden's model for total box-office
performance for new releases relies on a standard regression analysis as
well as log-linear regression techniques. 132
Two other representative works use a simplified set of variables to
predict box-office performance and/or profitability..Sogit Sochay, using a
multivariate OLS regression model, modeled a film's performance as de-
termined by three broad categories: creativity, scheduling/distribution
pattern, and marketing. 3 Sochay's results suggest that the film's genre, a
proven box-office star, the date of the film's release, and the total
screens/theaters allocated to the film drive the film's overall box-office
performance. Likewise, Abraham Ravid, in varied studies, focused on de-
134
terninants of a film's profitability by using a series of OLS regressions.
Ravid's work expanded the field by factoring in video-revenues and in-
ternational revenues to gauge overall film profitability. Significant variables
in his work include film budgets, reviewer ratings (after the first week of
release), film ratings, and sequel status. Notable results include Ravid's re-
jection of conventional wisdom that box-office stars matter for a film's
ultimate profitability. Of course, though OLS regression is the most com-
mon technique used in industry-analyses of this kind, other approaches
130. See Jeffrey Siminoff & Ilana Sparrow, Predicting Movie Grosses: Winners and Losers,
Blockbusters and Sleepers, 13 CHANCE 15 (2000). Their model uses two logged variables to
adjust for a skewed variable tail, a problem that my dataset does not have.
131. Id. at 16-17 (ten independent variables are: genre; rating; country of movie's
origin; two "star power" variables; production budget; sequel; holiday opening weekend;
number of screens; critic Roger Ebert's rating; and Academy Award nominations and
wins).
132. Zufryden, supra note 86.
133. See generally Scott Sochay, Predicting the Performance of Motion Pictures, 7 J. MEDIA
EcoN. 1 (1994).
134. See generally S. Abraham Ravid, Information, Blockbusters and Stars: A Study of the
Film Industry, 72 J. BUSINESS 463 (1999); S. Abraham Ravid & Suman Basuroy, Managerial
Objectives, the R-Rating Puzzle, and the Production of Violent Films, 77 J. BUSINESS S155
(2004).
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have been tested in experimental consumer analysis studies of film-going
behavior. 3 1
The set of regression models in this section is designed to test two
things: the validity of the profit-maximizing, race-neutral approach to dis-
tribution and the likelihood that inefficiency can be corrected by market
forces. I expect the data will demonstrate that holding independent varia-
bles constant, including actual revenue per theater (in the United States),
studios limit distribution of minority actor and majority-minority movies
solely on the basis of race. If true, this would bolster the argument of a
number of African-American actors and film-makers that majority-
minority led films are "given stiffer litmus tests" and that decisions are
never made "on an equal opportunity basis."' The null hypothesis of a
non-biased market is that the distribution of a movie is primarily influ-
enced by its perceived national popularity, audience appeal, and ability to
generate significant amounts of money per theater. To test this hypothesis,
three successive sets of models follow.
The source for the statistical analyses in this dataset is the Diversity
Film Index (DFI), a large-scale dataset I created specifically for this Article.
The dataset includes roughly three hundred films, with an array of inde-
pendent variables associated with each film.37 The economic data for each
film include (amongst other things): box-office performance, length of
release, per-screen average, per-screen totals, week-to-week performance,
and overall budget.3" The demographic information for each film in-
cludes: each film's distributor, length, rating, and category. The sociological
data includes: the race and gender of the featured actors, as well as select
actors' previous box-office history. 39 The dataset is an attempt to create
some order in a universe of high uncertainty. Therefore, it, like the market,
is imperfect. Because film production data is closely held, there was no
way to capture precise film cost (or marketing budget) during the period
analyzed here. Likewise, most films lack a pre-demand metric, and thus,
such a metric could not be included in this Article.
Further, few studies of the film marketplace focus on the ultimate
question at issue here: distribution. Instead, most models of studio and
consumer behavior focus on predicting box-office results. Since these
135. For an interesting example of a psychological approach to film-choice, using a
profit-based multi-sample model, see Ramya Neelamiegham and Dipak Jain, Consumer
Choice Process for Experience Goods:An Econometric Model and Analysis, 36 J. MARKETING RES.
373 (1999).
136. King, supra note 92, at R6.
137. The regressions in this Article were run with a finalized set of 274 films pri-
marily from the latter half of the 1990s.
138. Detailed descriptions of the variables used in the regressions can be found in the
Appendix.
139. Intercoder reliability is not an issue since the data were coded by the author.
Any questions about the small amount of films with subjective interpretation (such as, is
Jerry Maguire a romantic comedy?) are entirely fair game.
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questions are somewhat similar, it is useful to consider common sets of
independent variables used in the varied models. The previously men-
tioned studies of the film industry agree on some common predictive
elements. For example, Sharda, Amoto, and Meany gathered data for date
of release, rating, intensity of competition, star power, genre, technical ef-
fects, sequel, screens at opening, and final gross.o Rather than just the five
to ten variables typically gathered by these and other researchers, I include
race-related variables and other first-time-gathered data in an attempt to
shed new light on the distribution question. The dataset contains more
than one hundred films featuring minority actors in leading roles."' To
ensure a wide range of distribution in key variables within the dataset,
almost all movies with available demographic information that were re-
leased on more than five hundred screens during one portion of the latter
half of this period were included in the dataset.142
This gathering of data highlights a fact mentioned at the outset of
this Article: race, though at the core of our political and sociological land-
scape, has often been given short shrift in legal, political science,
economic, and business-school studies of marketplace outcomes in non-
competitive markets. Therefore, notwithstanding the above-mentioned
studies of film studio profitability, box-office forecasting, and studio distri-
bution efforts, this Article is the first to directly apply race-related research
and economic data as variables to be considered in discussing industry
economic outcomes in Hollywood.
B. Applied Models and Analysis
The following three models each focus on a different explanation
for race-gaps in movie distribution. The first model, examining factors
influencing per-theater grosses, is primarily designed to test whether a
film's Black-ness depresses moviegoer turnout, causing a lower per-screen
average. If this were true, studios could argue that the scope of distribu-
tion was restricted due to a sub-average level of interest in these types of
movies. If the assumption that the film's Black-ness depresses turnout
turns out to be false, one would expect that, holding other factors con-
stant, per-theater grosses of these films would be equal to other films.
140. Ramesh Sharda, Henry Amato, & Edith Meanty, Forecasting Gate Receipts Using
Neural Netvork and Rough Sets (Okla. State Univ.Working Paper, 1999).
141. Additional movies from earlier in the period were added to provide for greater
inclusion of diverse films and casts.
142. At the outset, I address a few peculiar statistical problems. Some have suggested
that showcasing a movie in fewer theaters would actually drive revenue per theater up.
Given that such a suggestion would undermine some of these models, the theory was
tested independently and the relationship actually moves in the opposite direction. As
available theaters increase, generally, so do per-theater, per-screen revenues.
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The second and third models build from a similar logic. The second
examines factors influencing overall box-office gross and challenges a fa-
miliar industry argument that majority-minority movies make less money
overall. For example, using a nationwide audience as the standard, if one
finds that, all things being equal, majority-minority movies do worse than
others in total box-office revenues, this result would suggest that studios
would be right to distribute these movies less widely and produce less of
them. On the other hand, if the model shows no independent negative
effect for race, then one can conclude that the average moviegoer does
not discriminate as much as industry experts predict. Finally, the third
model takes insights learned from the results of the first two and applies
them directly to the distribution question. Taking into account various
factors from the first two models, I test whether such factors, especially
race, suppress a film's distribution.
Model I: Per- Theater Gross
To begin, I examined a number of factors that were expected to in-
fluence per-theater film grosses and constructed a model to those
specifications.
The results proved more confounding than one might expect.1
First, the model shows that the presence of a "White star" significantly
impacts per-theater revenues more so than any other associated variable.
This finding, in part, confirms conventional wisdom that star-driven vehi-
cles tend to produce bigger results per theater. However, the results also
showed no significant relationship between the presence of a majority-
minority cast and per-theater revenues for general release movies.
Therefore, there would be no statistical reason to expect that of any two
random releases (both without "stars"), one featuring a majority-minority
cast would underperform compared to another movie without such a
cast. This has significant implications for theaters who underbooked ma-
jority-minority movies and for distributors who steered these movies to a
limited number of theaters. By demonstrating that a majority-minority
cast did not predictably drive down per-theater gross, this Article's data
suggests that the marketplace for majority-minority movies during the
1990s was underserved given the potential for increased revenues. In oth-
er words, when holding other factors constant, seats were filled for
majority-minority movies at the same rates for movies without such casts.
Finally, the model produced a number of helpful, but unexpected
results. While it has been argued that "R" ratings negatively impact total
box-office revenues, it appears that an "R" rating does not drive down the
per-theater revenues of movies in this study. Further, as movies became
longer in running time, their per-theater/-screen revenue did not de-
crease as expected. In addition, comedies were positively associated with
143. See infra Table 1.
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per-screen revenue, but romances did not have a clear effect on box-office
revenue. However, casting a proven box-office African-American star did
not have an apparent effect on per-theater success.While the inclusion of
data for movies like Independence Day and Men in Black would have
changed this result, their outlier status compromised the data as a whole.144
Finally, the data suggest that the inclusion of a minority or woman lead,
or a unority supporting character, has no significant effect on the per-
theater revenues of movies in general release. Therefore, an assumption
that such movies would underperform at any given theater might not be
reliable as a market-making variable.
Model II: Total Box-Office Revenue (U.S. totals only)
The working hypothesis following the first model was that total
box-office revenues could be predicted by the same factors that predict
per-theater revenues but with significant exceptions. 4 ' Because total
box-office revenues as a variable were moderately correlated with the
"Top-15" variable, that variable was excluded from the model.' Likewise,
general observation of the data indicated that blockbuster releases tended
to generate large movements in the relationship between box-office
revenues and maximum theaters. 4 7
As was true with respect to per-theater revenues, running time and
the inclusion of White male stars significantly increased a film's financial
bottom line. The effects ofAfrican-American stars washed out in the final
analysis, as did the effects of comedy on the box-office gross. There were
differences in the per-theater versus total U.S. gross models as to the sig-
nificant effects of a movie's rating and whether it was classified as a
comedy. The effects of a movie's "R" rating accord with conventional
wisdom that movies with such ratings cannot generate the long-term and
repeat audience traffic necessary to achieve a sufficiently high gross.'" The
144. Because African-American actor Will Smith starred in both movies (and both
performed phenomenally at the box office), the inclusion of them in the analysis dramati-
cally amplified the beta values for several variables and also increased their significance. It
"proved" that black stars mattered, in part because the per-theater grosses rose substantially
when such films were included. To ensure normality, these films were removed from this
analysis.The effects for white stars were not skewed in this fashion.
145. The line between causation and correlation in this model and the others is a
tight one, and reasonable people can differ.
146. The "Monthly Top 15" variable is a variable designed to control for the popu-
larity of the time period of a film's release. It is the average gross of the top fifteen movies
playing during that film's release. This variable helps to control for seasonal variations in
attendance and overall gross.
147. This connection will be explored in a later set of analyses that directly address
the distribution question. See infra Table 2.
148. Brian Fuson, Study: G is for the Greater Box Office, HOLLYWOOD RE'., Jan. 28,
1999. Additional data gathered from All- Time Box Office: USA, INTERNET MovIE DATABASE,
www.imdb.com/boxoffice/alltinmegross (last updated Nov. 18, 2012).
FALL 2012] 27
28 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 18:1
negative impact of the "R" rating can also explain, in part, the smaller
box-office returns from majority-minority films. Extrapolating from the
data in this Article, while 54 percent of the movies in this dataset were
rated "R," 74 percent of majority-minority movies had "R" ratings. Some
filmmakers have suggested that the MPAA's ratings system discriminates
against African-American films by using heightened standards of language,
violence, or sexual decency for films with largely minority casts. 9 If this
is true, it also negatively impacts the box-office draw for majority-
minority films and actively contributes to further market inefficiencies,
although this form of inefficiency is not caused by studios or distributors
themselves.
Model III: The Racial Impasse-Modeling Film Distribution
Based upon these observations regarding per-theater revenues and
overall box-office revenues, one can predict a number of factors that
should determine the scope of a film's distribution. The null hypothesis of
a "race-neutral" market was that the distribution of a movie would be
primarily influenced by its perceived national popularity, audience appeal,
and ability to generate significant amounts of money per theater. Re-
searchers agree that other factors driving distribution (besides any
individual theater booking preferences) include whether the film is rated
"R," whether it features actors who have recently been in popular films,
whether it faces strong competition during its time of release, and the
movie's genre. However, unlike this Article's previous tests, one might ex-
pect that if studios or distributors are discriminating against movies
featuring minorities, then significant, independent, and negative results
will be shown for the variables that involve minorities. In order to test
this marketplace skewing, it is necessary to use an outcome measure in
this model. In this case, final box-office gross was used as an independent
measure of a movie's overall pre-release popularity (i.e., pre-release de-
mand). In general, box-office grosses for majority-minority movies were
also significantly lower than the average film during the 1990s. Therefore,
if the dependent variable is total number of theaters and the key driving
variable is a post-distribution measure of demand, we can expect that no
other "demographic" variable should impact distribution. Therefore, if we
see significant effects in this equation, they would represent the degree to
which the objective demand calculus is consistently poorly estimated (by
149. The commercially successful director of JASON's LYRIC (The Jackson/McHenry
Company 1994) argued that the lengthy MPAA ratings approval process for some sexual
scenes in his majority-minority movie demonstrated that "if you have two Black people
making love, somehow, that's steamier than other people." Bernard Weinraub, Ratings Board
Blasted: Critics Say System Discriminatory, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 2, 1994. For
a more detailed examination of the ratings process, see Jacob Septimus, The MPAA Ratings
System: A Regime of Private Censorship and Cultural Manipulation, 21 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTs 69 (1996).
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leading studios, distributors, and theaters causing an over or under supply
of a given film to the national market)."s
The third model confirmed and disproved initial hypotheses about
factors that are either highly correlated with or actually influence distri-
bution. First, a number of variables that one might expect to achieve
significance (based on earlier models) did so here. The third model con-
firmed the non-significance of box-office leading women in distribution
decisions for films, as well as the minor significance of the box-office
grosses for competing films during the month of release. However, the
model also confirmed several relationships that independently drive a
film's distribution and serve as potential indicators of marketplace ineffi-
ciencies that cannot be explained by neutral economic factors.'5 ' To
analyze the significance of these results, each set of explanatory independ-
ent variables is explored in turn.
First, the third model's results do suggest a negative-impacting role
for race notwithstanding actual demand. These race-related effects shown
by the third model suggest that the historical evidence discussed earlier in
this Article matches the relationships shown in the data. Not only are
there independent effects for the presence of a majority-minority cast, but
there are additional significant effects when a lead actor is also an ethnic
minority. The overwhelming significance and beta value for majority-
minority demonstrates that even holding factors such as film popularity
(i.e., audience demand) constant, majority-minority movies are substan-
tially underdistributed for reasons that race-neutral market variables
cannot entirely explain.15 2
There are bound to be multiple and competing explanations of this
phenomenon. Why can the market players be consistently wrong? In the
context of this industry and with the data and examples deployed in this
analysis, one must-at a minimum-consider that the oligopolistic nature
of the market leads to the race-based inefficiencies identified here. If this
were the cause of such inefficiency, it would represent a profound failure
of both studio distributors and, to a lesser degree, theaters to exploit a
captive and demand-heavy market. Further, the independent significance
of the presence of an ethnic lead character also has irrational market dis-
tribution consequences. This demonstrates, in part, that the conventional
150. See infra Table 3.
151. Because this Article is limited to a discussion of race, I shall leave for future work
a discussion of the distribution regressions for variables that involve gender considerations.
152. See Daniel KahnemanJack L. Knetsch, & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint
on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Amw. EcoN. REv. 728,729-30 (1986) (describ-
ing the concept of a "reference transaction"-a benchmark that parties without equal
information can draw from to form rational expectations about the fairness of a contrac-
tual bargain). Here, where reference transactions involving the distribution of movies are
themselves false benchmarks, they undermine the bargaining power of racial minorities
involved in the production of those movies.
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wisdom of casting a few non-minority actors in majority-minority films
might have some bearing on the film's distribution; as shown earlier, it
does not, however, have any bearing on the ultimate per-theater or total
grosses. This observation, standing alone, is also evidence of some degree
of market inefficiency. 5 3
Confirming industry myth and previous practices, film attributes in-
cluding running time, movie rating, and movie type have significant and
independent effects on a movie's market distribution. Movies that are
longer tend to be distributed to fewer theaters. In addition, movies that
are rated "R" also tend to be distributed less widely. Finally, comedies
tend to be distributed less widely than other types of movies. These fac-
tors are particularly significant for their independent effects on movies
that feature ethnic minorities and adult themes. As movies become so-
phisticated in story telling, they become longer. As movies grapple with
mature subjects or adult comedy, they are more likely to be rated "R."
Additionally, movies with less sophisticated themes and less mature
subjects can easily lend themselves to comedy.The profound, independent
impact that each of these qualities has serves as another independent
negative market characteristic that will more heavily impact mature,
adult-oriented majority-minority films that may be produced by Holly-
wood studios. However, because the market for distribution reacts to
these film qualities in race-neutral ways, their impact will be felt above
and beyond the negative distribution impact for majority-minority films
generally. Therefore, one historical lesson derived from this data is that the
heavy concentration of "R" ratings and comedy in majority-minority
movies created independently negative distribution effects that were in
addition to the already substantial distribution biases against majority-
minority films.
C. Distributors' Defenses
When faced with anecdotal and empirical evidence of the type de-
scribed above, distributors might offer a number of arguments for why
they might distribute films starring racial minorities to fewer theaters than
non-minority films. First, distributors contend with a perception by thea-
ter chains and movie critics that stories featuring love themes or
non-violent plots fail to bring a large and diverse audience to the theater
for majority-minority films.15 4 In short, the studios and distributors are
153. As other quantitative analyses have demonstrated, this phenomenon also extends,
in part, to television network programming. See Robert Schmidt, Airing Race, BRILL'S
CorErNr, Oct. 2000, at 112.
154. While a string of movies in 1991 led many chains to embrace the profit making
potential of movies with mostly African-American casts, the under-performance of Direc-
tor John Singleton's non-violent 1993 movie POETIC JUSTICE (Columbia Pictures 1993)
dampened enthusiasm for majority-minority films. See, Pristin, supra note 112.
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simply creating and providing movies for audiences with distinct tastes
and preferences. As such, studio advocates argue that these consumer pref-
erence externalities (industry jargon for consumer demand) drive
production and distribution decisions, not some vague irrational market
prejudice by studios. Because the issue of demand is a compelling justifi-
cation for industry behavior, one must ask to what extent demand or
consumer preferences are relied upon or are reliable. Studios do not, how-
ever, discuss another quiet possibility: that White consumers consistently
reject movies with minority actors for racial reasons. It is also possible that
studios aggressively market movies for distribution but that individual
theater owners reject the movies.
The other significant set of distributor arguments actually seem to
focus on production, not distribution. Some studios argue that because
the international market for films now accounts for roughly 50 percent of
total revenues, movies without international appeal are less likely to be
distributed and marketed widely in the United States. During the period
studied here, films produced in the United States comprised 85 percent of
the international film market and 90 percent of the market in Europe.
As the international market for Hollywood films expands, some defenders
of these racial inequities argue that non-action films just do not fare well
in the lucrative overseas market.1 16 Duncan Clark, the head of the interna-
tional theatrical department at Sony, once argued, "Black baseball movies,
period dramas about football, rap, inner-city films-most countries can't
relate to that."' 7 The chairman of Universal Pictures added that "history
has said that African American movies don't translate" overseas."
Despite some efforts to address these discrepancies, these "interna-
tional market" arguments seem disingenuous for many reasons. First,
two-thirds of all movies produced during a representative year of this
study failed to earn a profit overseas. Thus, restricting production or dis-
tribution based on that metric might not be a reliable market-making
device.'" Second, if the distribution and marketing of these films in the
United States is based upon a faulty race-based logic, it might seem odd
that the American distributor "usually provides the worldwide marketing
155. One author who cites these and numerous related demographics is Judith Beth
Prowda, US. Dominance in the "Marketplace of Culture" and the French "Cultural Exception,"
29 N.YU.J. INT'L L. & POL. 193,200-01 (1997).
156. Masters & Trescott, supra note 122.
157. Quoted in Sharon Waxrnan, Hollywood Tailors Its Movies to Sell In Foreign Markets,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1998, at Al.
158. Id. (quoting Casey Silver).
159. See Robert W Welkos, Movie Production Spending Dips, but Marketing Costs Rise,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999 (quoting Bill Mechanic, 20th Century Fox's Chief Executive
Officer).
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plan and material for a film's marketing campaign." 6 0 For, if the American
campaign were based on flawed assumptions and an inaccurate market
demand, then this would surely be replicated if the same market-makers
crafted the plan for marketing and distribution overseas. Third, it will be
difficult to establish a strong overseas market for talented women and mi-
norities when distributors for action movies like Drop Zone change the
overseas posters to remove the lead Black actor's face and reduce the
prominence of his name.' Fourth, while some majority-minority movies
may fare poorly abroad, this logic still fails to address why these movies are
underdistributed in the United States. Fifth, some well-known movies fea-
turing prominent African-Americans have been foreign box-office profit
leaders.162 Studios that have failed to recognize the value of their majority-
minority domestic hits have suffered financial peril when others stepped
in to take over international distribution efforts.163 Further, majority-
minority films made for moderate budgets have consistently turned profits
even prior to foreign or video release.1 6' Throughout the 1990s, despite
some successes and an eight year record in the United States alone rang-
ing from 100 percent returns on investment to a break-even recovery, the
studio system continued to underdevelop and market films with minority
casts. Some suggest that the concomitant failure to seriously address
contentious issues on film was a product of Hollywood studios' desires to
160. Even where foreign market analysts suggest changes, they still must be approved
by the U.S. studio parent. See Danan, supra note 90, at 137.
161. The U.S. version of DROP ZONE (Paramount Pictures 1994) featured a large
photo of box-office talent Wesley Snipes and his name in big letters. The French posters
for the movie did not feature a picture of Snipes and reduced the prominence of his name.
The change was recommended because Snipes was less well known in France. He has
become more well-known since, but more for his advocacy involving the tax code than
his acting. During the data-period discussed here, Snipes was a large draw.
162. The Martin Lawrence and Will Smith feature BAD Boys (Don Simpson/Jerry
Bruckheimer Films 1995) and the Eddie Murphy vehicle DR. DOLITTLE (20th Century
Fox Film Corp. 1998) both generated foreign box office results larger than their already
impressive U.S. grosses. Significantly, both movies featured only minority characters in the
leading roles.While certainly an exception, the virtually all-minority Eddie Murphy mov-
ie COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988) grossed $350 million on the
international market. See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 93, at 46.
163. One notable example was the domestic hit SISTER ACT (Touchstone Pictures
1992), featuring Whoopi Goldberg. Disney aggressively promoted it overseas and made
$143 million. See Waxman, supra note 157, at 3.
164. Even lesser known movies like JASON's LYRIC (The Jackson/McHenry Co. 1994)
produced strong profits-both by its film and soundtrack. Made for under $7 million, the
movie grossed $6.3 million in only its first twelve days of release. See Louis B. Parks, 'Lyric'
Director Takes Different Look at City, HousTON CHRON., Oct. 7, 1994.
165. No studio that released a majority-minority movie to a minimum of five hun-
dred theaters during the 1990s reported a negative return in expenditures.
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make their fortunes by "purveying comfortable notions about American
culture."'6 6
In addition, producers and distributors might argue that since films
with no racial diversity sell well, there is no reason to change their behav-
ior. Since films with no diversity can sell, there seems to be no benefit in
adding significant numbers of minority actors into the mix of films
scheduled for production and no need to think deeply about racial as-
sumptions in the distribution calculus. Indeed, one studio's vice president
of development notes that "[t]here's [sic] no [B]lacks in Saving Private
Ryan or There's Something About Mary, and they sold at the box office. So
there's not a lot of incentive to make changes. It's wrong, but that's the
reality."'6 7 Further, this same-race approach to marketing reinforces the
dominant view (which I suggest is the result of lack of competition)
that studios do not even consider the possibility of a White audience
attending a majority-minority movie. Likewise, in television production,
the success of the all-White Seinfeld reinforced the idea that both net-
works and advertisers can create hits without regard for the inclusion of
racial minorities-even when the show is based in a diverse city like
NewYork.
Next, distributors would remind critics that they have already cap-
tured the minority audience-whether for majority-minority films or
non-Black wide-release films. In short, studios know the following: mar-
ket research has long demonstrated that African-Americans consume
entertainment at rates exceeding the non-minority population. As de-
scribed earlier, African-Americans watch 40 percent more television than
non-Blacks;" 9 additionally, as mentioned earlier, though they comprise 12
percent of the population, they are 25 percent of the market for commer-
cial films.O This has led to an unusual problem of supply and demand.
Social science literature indicates that African-Americans accept, desire,
and maintain a significantly higher percentage of Black-White integration
in their social (and political) lives than the average White-American."'
166. See Nurse, supra note 95. (providing a rich contrast of the commercial success of
the love story TirANic (20th Century Fox 1997) and the per-theater success, but overall
box-office stale, performance of AMisTAD (DreamWorks SKG 1997)).
167. An anonymous studio executive quoted in Allison Samuels & John Leland,
They've Got Next, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1999. The executive was also wrong; THERE'S
SOMETHING ABOUT MARY (20th Century Fox Film Corp.) featured well-respected African-
American actor Keith David in the part of Mary's stepfather.
168. See, e.g., Barry Garton, Press Tour Plays Race Card, HOLLYWOOD REP., July 20,
1999.
169. Jacqueline Trescott, For Blacks, 50 Years on tie TV Fringes, WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
1999.
170. Nurse, supra note 95.
171. Professor Ely argues that in the context of political representation,White voters
consider Blacks a threat when Blacks reach a certain percentage of the voting population.
In contrast, Black voters "are probably so accustomed to [Wlhite people being a majority
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Given that this is so, the average African-American consumer has little
difficulty choosing integrated or predominantly White cultural options for
entertainment; the experience of sharing cross-cultural interactions is
familiar and does not produce negative reactions.172 Since African-
Americans, therefore, can comfortably embrace existing entertainment
options at much higher rates than their White counterparts, the economic
incentive to diversify entertainment options to add more
African-American or minority characters to "White" films (or television
shows), for example, is extremely low.
One might wonder about two clear empirical results from the three
models that this Article presents that seem contrary to a theory of market
inefficiency: (a) that White-male stars impact a film's final revenue
substantially, and (b) that (on average) majority-minority films make less
than other films. How can these results be reconciled with claims that
those distribution decisions are irrational? In short, why can't it be that
race-skewing in the marketplace is simply a market exemplar of statistical
discrimination?
With respect to the independent effect of White-male stars on a
movie's revenue, this effect is nonetheless consistent with a market that
also exhibits racially skewed outcomes that are inefficient. When the
presence of White-male stars is held constant, the presence of a majority-
minority cast does not negatively impact revenue. In other words, for pure
box-office revenue, it is theoretically more efficient to make movies
only with proven White-or Black-box-office stars. It is the other
universe-the majority of all films without a guaranteed star-where the
racial-skewing lacks a rational market purpose. Put differently, the data
suggest there is no box-office expected difference between the returns of
two movies if neither has box-office stars and if the only thing distin-
guishing them is the race of the actors.
It is true, however, that majority-minority films earn less money on
average, but this misses the anticompetitive point. If distribution of major-
ity-minority films is substantially less than other films on average, we
would expect to see, on average, a similar shifting of box-office perfor-
mance downwards for such films. In fact, there is such a downward
performance (since additional screens are tied to additional revenue), but
the downward performance is much less than the data would predict in a
non-racially skewed world. In other words, when the relationship be-
that experiencing them as even a sizeable majority is likely to seem more relief than
threat." See John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 576, 593 (1997) (exploring legal issues related to white voters who challenge their
redistricting from a majority-white to a majority-minority district).
172. Some prominent research programs suggest that members of "low-status" in-
groups manifest in-group bias less than members of "high-status" groups. See, e.g., Marilyn
B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
570 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).
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tween box-office revenue and distribution is held constant, the negative
effects of race as an independently acting variable further drag distribu-
tion downward to a lower point than it should be if distribution is tied
solely to expected demand and projected box-office performance.
The foregoing analysis rests on certain assumptions about the con-
nection between budgets, profits, risk, and race. Because budgets and
advertising expenses are closely held for many films, it is difficult to pre-
cisely estimate the overall return on investment for most of the films in
the 1990s. However, none of the evidence gathered for this Article sug-
gested that a majority-minority movie was not "profitable."The question,
then, becomes one of profit scope and maximization. If majority-minority
movies are only expected to have a finite tail of profit distribution and
other movies have a potentially unlimited profit distribution tail (e.g., The
Dark Knight, which earned more than $500 million in the United States
alone),"' it could be a rational strategy to focus exclusively on producing
and distributing movies that carried both a higher degree of risk and the
potential for a higher return. However, in a purely competitive market,
one might expect that the majority-minority films, with a no-loss history
and at least a mild-rate of return, would attract an equal amount of in-
vestment and attention from investors willing to make their spread over
ten movies and not one. However, there is no evidence that this market-
shifting took place.
In a marketplace with five dominant players during the 1990s, there
were few incentives to make such an investment. Hollywood studios ar-
gued that the limited distribution of majority-minority films was rational
following the moderate profits (in raw dollars generated) of many majori-
ty-minority films during the 1990s.1" Unfortunately, for those who
sought to expand the marketplace for majority-minority films, even the
successful producers or directors of earlier works such as New Jack City,
Boyz N the Hood, Hollywood Shuffle, and Malcolm X did not consistently
produce box-office rates of return equivalent to those movies."' Further,
because the market's demand metrics were so crude, there was no availa-
ble research throughout the 1990s that would indicate what types of films
the African-American consumer consistently supported or what types of
173. See The Dark Night, Box OFFICE MOoj (Sep. 26, 2012, 8:23 PM),
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/niovies/?id=darkknight.htm.
174. See Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social
Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. EcoN. 1109 (1991) (discussing economics of "quality-
certification" process).
175. Mario Van Peebles followed NEW JACK CITY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1991) with
the low-grossing POSSE (PolyGram Filmed Entertainment 1993). John Singleton's PoEIc
JUSTICE performed poorly compared to Bovz N THE HOOD. The studio-backed THE FIVE
HEARTBEATS (20th Century Fox 1991) and THE METEOR MAN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1993) underperformed Robert Townsend's privately funded first movie. And, following
MALCOLM X (Largo Int'l NV. 1992), Spike Lee's movies during the 1990's were profitable
but on a smaller scale.
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majority-minority films would generate sufficient non-minority audienc-
es. As a result, even John Singleton, director of the highly profitable
Boyz N the Hood, noted that he had to "press"Warner Brothers for more
money to complete his fourth film, which eventually cost $28 million.
D. Revisiting "Faux-Competition": Why Inequities Might Persist
None of these proffered excuses or defenses for skewing directly re-
buts evidence gathered for this Article. If one accepts the empirical
results-whether as causal proof or mere correlations-they nonetheless
demonstrate that rational firm behavior deviates significantly from
commercial optimality in the real world.17 During the 1990s, films
featuring minorities were not, as was commonly believed, economically
inefficient engines of studio and theater profit. Instead, one might expect
that if the market for these films was underserved, theaters showing these
films would actually have higher average revenue than for most other
types of motion pictures.' 9 As a result of the limited screen space, howev-
er, these films often did not generate a large overall box-office intake. If
the films were featured on screens in proportion to their actual demand,
they would have generated even more income for studios/distributors and
for women and minorities in the entertainment marketplace. Something
about this market inefficiency during the 1990s seems particularly striking
given that the failure to find the most profitable movies to book also hit
theater chains in their pocketbooks. Between 1999 and 2001, America's
four biggest theater chains, Loews, Regal, Carmike and AMC lost more
than $340 million. While acknowledging its losses, Carmike blamed the
studios' aggressive financial terms for booking and keeping Hollywood
big-budget movies as the reason for theaters' large financial losses.'o Per-
haps an investment in majority-minority films might have proven more
successful.
176. This production and distribution conundrum is highlighted by Black filnunaker
Warrington Hudlin. See Warrington Hudlin, Black Film Blossoms Without Hollywood, NEWS-
DAY, Apr. 14, 1996, at 46-47.
177. Bernard Weinraub, Witness's Courage Sustained Director, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 26,
1997, at E9.
178. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in THE RA-
TIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 203 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto,
Mark Perlman, & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996).
179. This has been true since at least the per-theater dominance of NEW JACK CITY
(Warner Bros. 1991) and Bovz N THE HOOD (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1991). In 1994,
the majority-minority JASON'S LYRIC (The Jackson/McHenry Co. 1994) was ranked third
overall during its first weeks of release, despite playing at only 40 percent of the total thea-
ters of the box office leader. Similarly, the movie AMisTAD (DreamWorks SKG 1997) came
close to dominating the weekly charts, despite playing in roughly only 25 percent of the
theaters of the box office leader.
180. For a more detailed explanation, see SHONE, supra note 26, at 290-91.
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When summarizing the profit maximization model employed
throughout Hollywood's first century, all available evidence suggests a
model of imprecision, guess work, and instinct, and a lack of rigorous
models and demand analysis. Therefore, it would not be entirely surprising
that studios, distributors, and theaters could not accurately match distribu-
tion with eventual grosses and profit. Given the presumptions surrounding
majority-minority films in this concentrated market, it is only somewhat
surprising that these films were generally given an overly-pessimistic dis-
tribution base. But, there are a number of reasons why this might occur,
and not all of these reasons have to be rooted in racial animus, racial dis-
crimination, or subtle corporate racial bias. Risk aversion may play a role,
and the status-quo/path-dependency inherent in a non-competitive sys-
tem might also be factors. How might these factors be interrelated?
Many explanations might account for market inefficiency, but evi-
dence gathered for this Article suggests that one plausible explanation of
the inefficient behavior of Hollywood studios might be that
market-skewing by race is plausibly induced by lack of competition in
both production and distribution."' The scarcity of wide-release produc-
ers and the concentration of distribution and production amongst roughly
a dozen producers, suppliers, and distributors of such content make the
race-based input and output problem a fairly entrenched one.18 2 As one
assessment notes, "Hollywood's creations are the mirror in which Ameri-
cans see themselves-and the current racially skewed reflection is
dangerously distorted."18 3
How can this be? Professor Ian Ayres offers one solution-"beliefs
that are based on erroneous stereotypes may not be tested by the market
equilibrium. If market experience does not teach sellers that their precon-
ceptions are false, disparate treatment that is both inequitable and
inefficient will persist."'8 4 Ayres points out that it is possible for firms to
maintain false beliefs in a growing and profitable market or in a weakly
competitive one. These beliefs become self-perpetuating because consum-
ers will respond to a stereotypical approach in a predictable way and
reinforce the stereotype."" Put differently by Cooter, increased competi-
tion intrinsically allows for "[p]eople with different perspectives [who]
181. For a detailed analysis of the effects that the antitrust problem has with respect
to the narrower issue of pricing, see Barak Y Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion
Picture Industry, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 317 (2004).
182. The diversity of content providers and distributors, though never wide, has nar-
rowed further over the last five years. For broader perspective on this consolidation, see
Stephen R. Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part 1: Control of Cable Systems
by Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. REv. 221 (1970).
183. Lambert, supra note 93.
184. See Ian Ayres, Fair Drivin2: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotia-
tions, 104 HARy. L. REv. 817, 850 (1991).
185. Id. at 853.
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tend to notice things that would be missed by people with the same per-
spective."186 Since oligopolies and cartelistic industries may be more likely
to implement discriminatory practices, one benefit of increased
competition, new actors, and new perspectives should be a reduction in
market-wide racial bias.
In other words, highly consolidated industries can produce racially
disparate impacts or remain subtly racially biased because they lack the
economic pressure, knowledge, or robust market mechanisms to create
pressure to change. These antitrust problems are indeed part of the under-
lying issue here: since the five major studios and their distributors supplied
90 percent or more of all film content to the nation's theater screens dur-
ing the 1990s, it would have been difficult for outside firms to penetrate
the market to change this discriminatory calculus. 1 7 The data gathered for
this Article, while establishing a correlative effect between consolidation
and race-based inefficiency, cannot decisively prove that one causes the
other. Nonetheless, the combination of historical and empirical evidence
suggests that as firms become more dominant in the marketplace, these
race-based inefficiencies increased over time.
During the 1990s, the racial impasse in the distribution market was
enhanced by yet another powerful reason why market actors did not
modify their behavior. Between 1990 and 2000, total box-office grosses
increased from $5.0218 billion to $7.661 billion; in most years, the rate of
growth far outpaced inflation.' 8 In other words, more than ten years of
(more or less) increasing revenue gave studios and distributors little incen-
tive to dislodge their folk beliefs regarding production and distribution
strategies of movies predominated by minority actors."9 Ayres's reflections
are also consistent with the insights of social psychologists. Floyd Allport's
widely discussed analysis of pluralistic ignorance bears some similarity to
the inefficiencies of markets discussed here.'90 For Allport, pluralistic igno-
rance exists when, within a group of individuals, each person quietly
believes that his or her own perception, behavior, and understanding of
the relevant world are different than those of his or her colleagues. Rather
than risking taking an unorthodox position or revealing a departure from
expectations, the group member instead chooses to go along with the
186. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 133, 142
(1994).
187. See, e.g., Studio Market Share, Box OFFICE Mojo, http://www.boxofficenojo.com/
studio/?view=company&view2=yearly&yr=2011&p=.htm (last updated Oct. 5,2012).
188. See Yearly Box Office, Box OFFICE Mojo, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/
yearly/ (last updated Oct. 5, 2012).
189. This behavior suggests that, at some level, corporations and distributors believed
that their actions were both efficient and revenue maximizing, but if such actions were not
(as the data suggests), they would have made more money with a more strategic (and less
race-centered) approach.
190. See FLOYD H. ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 390-91 (1924).
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group's perceived norm out of a desire to fit into the group and exemplify
the group's philosophy."' Applying these insights to the results in this Ar-
ticle suggests that it is possible that the disparities identified here could be
apparent to some or many within the system, but without a systemic
change in the higher levels of decision making (e.g., the studio focus on
"blockbusters"), such insights might be more quietly held out of respect
for the group's dominant position.
Toward the end of the 1990s, some promising trends emerged. In
the summer of 2000, for example, over the course of four successive
weekends, four different films with African-American leads opened with
significant distribution and with the week's top grosses.192 This develop-
ment, coming on the heels of an explosion of teenage interest in hip-hop
culture, found one critic applauding the developments and concluding
that "Black-themed movies [are] no longer just for a niche market."" Yet,
given the cyclical nature of distribution trends throughout that decade, it
would be hasty to suggest that the period between 2000 and 2010 would
prove, for that reason, to be substantially different. Further work on more
recent trends will be left to future study.
Given the overall historical posture of the industry, coupled with the
context and data presented in this Article, the question is not "do the
race-based distribution inequities need to be fixed?" but "how might we
do so?" For a variety of complicated reasons, the solutions to this market-
wide failure do not lie in traditional anti-discrimination law; instead, the
solution lies in market-driven initiatives and the potential for antitrust
action. To explain why those remedies work best in this market, it is useful
to review the full arsenal of tools in the anti-discrimination toolbox and
how they might be applied to the market bias described above.
III. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION TOOLBOX
When contemplating solutions for market-wide inefficiencies that
may lead to racial bias, solutions can range from aggressive civil rights ac-
tions to a hands-off approach and market-force corrections. In this
market, however, neither of these familiar paradigms may solve for the
diffuse nature of the market harm or the difficulty in measuring how the
harm is manifested. If these familiar arguments are unavailing, then we
should not expect traditional civil rights remedies to be particularly
191. See Dale T Miller and Cathy McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When similarity is
interpreted as dissimilarity, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsycHoL. 298 (1987).
192. The films were Martin Lawrence's BIG MOMMA's HOUSE (20th Century Fox
2000), Eddie Murphy's NUTTY PROFESSOR II: THE KLUMPs (Universal Pictures 2000), Sam-
uel L. Jackson's SHAFT (Paramount Pictures 2000), and the Wayans Brothers' ScAnY MOVIE
(Dimension Films 2000).
193. Elvis Mitchell, Snap! Kiss that Niche Market Goodbye, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 14, 2000,
at El.
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successful in their current form or in an evolved state. Instead, for a
market-wide problem like this, one might pivot toward market-wide
solutions that are either voluntary industry-led efforts or government-
driven efforts based on antitrust law. To determine whether the familiar
anti-discrimination categorizations might work better as market resolving
forces, it is useful to outline their strategic logic, apply the most common-
ly used frameworks, and then compare them to market-based solutions,
antitrust law, and other alternatives.
A. Familiar Paradigms
When proposing remedies for the type of racially-skewed decision-
making and outcomes described here,19 4 one must consider the concerns
that are commonly raised when advancing methods designed to eliminate
new or subtle forms of bias. As Professor Rhode sets out in her recent
work on expanding certain coercive anti-bias regimes, "[I]n considering
these questions, it often makes sense to consider both the nature of the
characteristic and the context of discrimination."'" Asking whether ineq-
uities in film distribution markets warrant the expansion of existing legal
frameworks implicates the broader theoretical question of whether any
intervention to eliminate such bias would be warranted in the first place.
Both free-market and anti-discrimination regime perspectives have strong
advocates and an internal logic supported by theoretical models. 19 6
The debate about remedying racial-bias begins with those who in-
sist that a government enforcement regime is neither necessary nor
appropriate.'"9 The free marketplace, dependent upon maximizing profits
from a diverse array of workers and consumers, will not discriminate by
race.'9 8 Government race-based regulations that seek to monitor, control,
194. Some may argue that this skewing is proof of bias; others will claim that it is
proof merely of flawed judgment. Regardless, it is a form of inefficient behavior that is
practiced by corporations and which appears to be against the corporations' self interest.
195. Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1048
(2009).
196. The formalities are ably detailed in the provocative exchange between Donohue
and Judge Posner in a series of engaging articles. See John J. Donohue IlI, Further Thoughts
on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv 523
(1987); John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986); Richard
A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy ofTitle VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987).
197. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 716-28 (5th ed. 1998). A
broad overview of the "law and economics" approach to regulation can be found in A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND EcoNoMics (2d ed. 1989).
198. Following such logic, corporations who harbor racial biases or false perceptions
about individuals will falsely judge the marketplace, imposing a cost for their bias. Recog-
nizing this cost will cause the holder of the false beliefs to eliminate them. See, e.g., David
A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Nu-
merical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991).
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and specifically outlaw racial discrimination in employment are inefficient
and unnecessary because they interfere with the natural Darwinian con-
sequences of inefficient economic choices. They further exacerbate
economic inefficiency. In short, firms that continue to discriminate in
employment will suffer from the ultimate punishment-they will lose
business, lose profit, and perish, so government intervention is superflu-
199
ous.
Therefore, rather than constraining the market, some might argue
that the law should let the natural economic order run its course. Howev-
er, based on the status quo of extensive regulations, free market theorists
suggest that market bias will never be eliminated. This is so because the
existing government race-based regulations promote market inefficiency
and exacerbate market bias by thwarting the market's natural methods of
uprooting irrational race-based behavior. However, few adherents to the
free market view within the political system are willing to extend that
argument to its logical legislative conclusions.20 Even free-market argu-
ments can allow for some anti-discrimination legal remedies "to the
extent that there is monopoly or restricted entry" into various markets.201
How these principles might directly apply to non-competitive markets
like those discussed here remains unclear; most scholarship in this tradi-
tion focuses on laws affecting labor and employment in the
202hiring/employment market and not transactional markets for products.
Others argue that most or all forms of racial bias can be eliminated
by government intervention. Discrimination and the types of bias identi-
fied here, at their core, are not rational. Therefore, individuals and
organizations can (and do) discriminate in a variety of ways, despite the
fact that such discrimination is profit-limiting, illegal, or both. Advocates
for anti-bias laws argue that individual and organization behavior is not
nearly as ordered and efficient as free-market theorists would have us
199. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 43-45 (2d ed. 1971).
200. One reason may be that scholars who advocate the use of markets as the answer
to eliminating discrimination acknowledge that even perfect competition will not elimi-
nate the more subtle manifestations of discrimination that exist in today's complicated
marketplace. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIE-
Go L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1994).
201. Richard A. Epstein & Erwin Chemerinsky, Should Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 Be Repealed?, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 349, 353 (1993).
202. See Becker, supra note 174 (examining market discrimination from this perspec-
tive). The earliest modern scholarly approach to this idea can be found in MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 109-10 (1962) (arguing that laws against discrimina-
tion are inefficient because market forces will eliminate it). RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLoYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAws (1992);
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3
(Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973); Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private
Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 Alm. EcoN. REv. 340
(1983); Ray Marshall, The Economics of Racial Discrimination: A Survey, 12 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE 849 (1974).
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believe.203 Government regulation can serve to change and define the
preferences of firms and individual actors.204 However, some anti-
discrimination law advocates would take this argument further by
expanding legal remedies for multiple forms of bias, eliminating distinc-
tions between willful and accidental discrimination, expanding tort
regimes to punish racially insulting language, 205 and considering unique
ways of addressing past discrimination-like reparations.206 Rejecting the
claims of the free-marketers, these theorists have also relied on traditional
econometrics to bolster their positions.207
Despite the normative appeal of arguing that federal law should be
further expanded to enforce compliance with anti-discrimination ideals,20
the evidence gathered for this Article suggests that at least with respect to
film distribution markets, such efforts might be counterproductive. Why
might such efforts be ineffective or counter-productive? The roots of such
answers are in the limitations of traditional civil rights frameworks, which
have not been easily applied to entertainment industry matters generally209
and have been construed with a particular emphasis on employer actions
in a traditional employer/employee relationship.210
B. Traditional Anti-Discrimination Law: Not an Option
Title VII has been the cornerstone of anti-discrimination law for
almost sixty years, and the full history of that Act will not be recounted
203. See RICHARD H. THALER, Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus, in FOUNDA-
TIONS OF RESEARCH IN EcoNoMIcs: How Do EcoNoMIsTs Do EcoNoMIcs? (Steven G.
Medema &Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996).
204. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217 (1993).
205. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
206. See, e.g., Tuneen Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Exam-
ining theArgument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1999).
207. See, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Shaky Grounds: The Case Against the Case Against Anti-
discrimination Laws, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 725 (1994) (skeptically reviewing the free-market
argument in RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws (1991)).
208. See, Heather R. James, Note, If You Are Attractive And You Know It, Please Apply:
Appearance Based Discrimination And Employers' Discretion, 42 VAL. U. L. REv. 629 (2008)
(arguing that employers need more, not less, latitude when using appearance as a hiring
criteria); see also Hannah Fleener, Looks Sell, But Are They Worth the Cost?: How Tolerating
Looks-Based Discrimination Leads to Intolerable Discrimination, 83 WASH U. L.Q. 1295 (2005).
209. See, e.g., Lois L. Krieger, "Miss Saigon" and Missed Opportunity: Artistic Freedom,
Employment Discrimination and Casting for Cultural Identity in the Theatre, 43 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 839, 862 (1992).
210. See, e.g., Devon W Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1259 (2000) (critiquing such emphasis in part).
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here.2 1  The most frequently used provisions of Title VII forbid most em-
ployers from intentionally discriminating against an employee because of
that employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."212 MoSt
individual cases under Title VII rely on either direct or circumstantial
evidence of discrimination. 213 The Supreme Court set out the standard for
analyzing these claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.214 But several
market barriers prevent Title VII anti-discrimination actions from work-
ing in a non-competitive market such as the one discussed in this
Article. 2 15 This is not to suggest that such barriers are insurmountable; in-
stead, it is to recognize that in a marketplace such as the one described
here, such regimes are more difficult to apply.
The first barrier to applying traditional anti-discrimination regimes
to market-wide bias is rooted in the structure of certain non-competitive
industries like Hollywood's film market. If a film producer or financier
were to sue in such a non-competitive environment, a comparable busi-
ness opportunity in the immediate geographic area-or even
nationwide-would likely not be available.216 As such, even if discrimina-
tion occurs, the pressure to remain successfully engaged in a professional
endeavor within a consolidated or non-competitive market likely out-
weighs the value of filing a traditional claim of racial discrimination.
The second barrier to a successful market-wide discrimination claim
by an affected participant is a network effect. In a public professional net-
work such as film production or distribution (along with law professors,
doctors, and so on), accusing one's business colleagues of biased or racist
behavior or market dealings often means that said colleagues will be the
211. For a detailed view of the history surrounding the Act's enactment, see PHILIP A.
KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999).
212. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2006).
213. See, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 E3d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1997).
214. 411 U.S.792,802-03 (1973).
215. There are many other costs and barriers. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business
Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709-10 (1993) (demonstrating a connection between the national
business cycle and the decisions of individuals to initiate employment discrimination law-
suits). There are other factors not caused by market forces, like an individual's patience
with the lengthy pre-lawsuit process, the psychological difficulties in engaging in a public
examination of one's job performance, and the anxiety caused by the high uncertainty of
winning, and other non-market factors. See also Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor,
Why Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Discrimination that Confronts
Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and Perceived Control, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 373
(1997).
216. As Donohue and Siegelman demonstrate, most plaintiffs in employment dis-
crimination cases are not working for the alleged discriminator at the time they file the
lawsuit-suggesting a great impediment remains to filing when one intends to continue
working for the same employer. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Chanrging
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1025-27 (1991).
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subject of a highly publicized dispute within that profession.27 Thus, even
if other professional avenues are available as options, a typical plaintiff
might avoid a discrimination lawsuit that would cause other potential
business partners to view him or her as tainted goods.218 For example:
Producer Litigation Larry sues Distributor X and Theater Chain Y, claim-
ing racial bias in distribution patterns and practices. It is highly likely that
Distributor Z in the same city and Theater Chain A will learn of this dis-
pute through trade magazines and other networks, and this could affect
their willingness to engage in a nationwide distribution plan for Producer
Larry's additional films.
The third major barrier to filing a traditional anti-discrimination
claim in non-competitive markets is the lack of direct proof of bias, such
as objective criteria for evaluating a product's inherent worth or a compa-
rable reference group for the product. 219 Large bureaucratic firms, ranging
from the government to large corporations, claim to use evaluation crite-
ria that naturally "leave less room for subjective and potentially
discriminatory judgments.220 However, in markets like film distribution,
much of the work product and placement is subjectively evaluated ac-
cording to taste, skill, results, aesthetic, and other intangible factors, which
are quite vulnerable to an infusion of racial bias.22 ' Against these various
subjective categories, an individual challenging distribution practices
would somehow have the very difficult task of showing that the original
222distribution plan was objectively wrong. In short, when so much about
a service's or product's value is subjectively evaluated, applying a modern
217. See generally PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN
AMERICA (2000);JOSEPH JETT WITH SABRA CHARTRAND, BLACK AND WHITE ON WALL STREET:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE MAN WRONGLY ACCUSED OF BRINGING DowN KIDDER PEA-
BODY (1999).
218. This argument applies to gender bias as well as race bias. See, e.g., AAUW EDUC.
FOUND. & AAUW LEGAL ADVOCACY FUNDTENURE DENIED: CASES OF SEx DISCRIMINATION
IN ACADEMIA 67-69 (2004).
219. Krieger demonstrates that inter-group bias and discrimination often occur when
organizations fail to provide a detailed and precise set of performance evaluation guide-
lines that allow for each individual to be evaluated according to the same criteria. See
Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1246 (1995). Because these eval-
uations are subjective, they are difficult to evaluate across different employees in a typical
employment discrimination case.
220. Harry J. Holzer, Whiy Do Small Establishments Hire Fewer Blacks Than Larger Ones?
33 J. Hum. RESOURCES 896, 907 (1988). However, though subjective judgments might be
harder, other forms of discrimination (such as patronage or nepotism) can remain even
more difficult to detect in positions where formal entry-level criteria are low.
221. See generally Susan T Fiske, et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereo-
typing Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049 (1991).
222. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (holding that sub-
jective employment decision-making criteria can be challenged under a theory of
disparate impact).
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anti-discrimination regime to analyze a subjective decision or practice is
"neither empirically nor economically feasible."223
Title VII is the most commonly used method of litigating federal
discrimination claims, but it is not the only option.2 24 Here, focusing on
federal law, a few alternatives are left to remedy nuanced cases of racial
bias and 5 1981 is chief among them.225 To prove a claim under 5 1981, an
individual needs to show (a) membership in a racial minority group, (b)
an act of discrimination concerning the making or enforcing of a con-
tract, and (c) the discriminating person or company intended to
discriminate on the basis of race. 2 6 The key difference between enforce-
ment of Title VII and § 1981 is that claims under § 1981 must show that
227the offending party engaged in purposeful discrimination. The test for
intentional discrimination in § 1981 lawsuits is the same as the Title VII
test for discriminatory treatment .228 First, the plaintiff must bring forth
direct evidence of disparate treatment and make a prima facie case of in-
tentional discrimination. Then, the burden of persuasion shifts, and the
defendant must rebut the direct evidence of discrimination by proving
that it would have made the same choice even if it had not taken race
into account.229 Although discrimination must be intentional, it need not
be based on racial animus; racial categorization and discrimination will
suffice. 23 0 The problem with § 1981 lawsuits in non-competitive markets
like film distribution is essentially the same as with Title VII: individual
litigants have evidentiary barriers and risks to future business prospects.
Further, it is not clear that § 1981 claims for market buyers can be applied
to market sellers.231 If § 1981's scope does not include marketplace sellers,
then producers and owners of films would not be able to rely on its pro-
visions. Therefore, like Title VII, § 1981 lawsuits would not be the most
223. Krieger, supra note 219, at 1232.
224. At state and local levels, of course, additional legal remedies exist but will not be
discussed extensively here.
225. PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 1, at 125-36 (describing use of §5 1981-82 as
remedies in cases of patron discrimination, as in Ayres's car audit study described earlier).
226. See, e.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, Inc., 493 U.S. 929 (1989) (a plaintiff pro-
ceeding solely on a theory of disparate impact is limited to Title VII and cannot seek
5 1981 remedies).
227. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982).
Ayres suggests that amending 5 1981 to allow for disparate impact claims would help to
further combat market-wide racial bias. See PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 1, at 136.
While Ayres is correct, the likelihood of amending § 1981 at this point is too slim to allow
for vigorous discussion of its merits as a plausible or immediate remedy.
228. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989).
229. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).
230. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,668 (1987) (finding § 1981
liability even though "there was no [sic] suggestion ... that the [defendant] held any racial
animus").
231. See generally PERVASIVE PREJUDICE, supra note 1 (focusing on buyer remedies
against discriminating sellers).
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efficient options for individuals experiencing market-wide discrimination
232in film distribution markets.
Amending anti-discrimination laws, so as to make them more appli-
cable to the market problems described in this Article, is also not ideal. As
Professor Rhode explained when summarizing the prevailing view of
those opposed to expanding bias law in this way, there are two primary
concerns.233 The first concern, articulated by both progressive and classical
theorists, is that the law should not deal with such murky waters because
some cultural tastes and styles are simply not mutable or worth legal
234
attention. Others worry that expanding the law to include unfamiliar
forms of bias risks trivializing existing bias claims in familiar categories by
essentially watering down the overall potency of the total amount of dis-
231
crimination cases. So why should a market participant rely on
traditional enforcement mechanisms or expanding them to include new
and novel theories of discrimination? Instead, as a useful alternative, mar-
ket initiatives and antitrust theories may provide easier solutions to the
market problems identified in this Article.
C. Market-Based Solutions and Antitrust Remedies
Given the above reasons that traditional anti-discrimination regimes
are difficult to apply to this market, market-driven solutions and the
heavy hand of antitrust law remain as the most viable law-based solutions
136
to racially biased market outcomes. For example, interested corporations
could create additional sub-companies for creating alternative production
and distribution patterns in non-competitive markets. Corporations expe-
riencing discrepancies between lack of minority supply and a strong
demand for certain products could, of course, expand the network of dis-
tribution of those products. Further, outside corporations and individual
actors could, in theory, respond to corporate intransigence by entering
into the marketplace and creating and/or distributing new supply to fill
the needs of the existing market base. Similar to the National Football
League's approach to coaching vacancies, corporations could contractually
agree to hear a minimum number of "diversity" proposals per year or to
implement market diversification strategies in markets that have been
232. Consumers in a non-competitive market also cannot easily challenge a race-
biased market structure, but that is not my focus here.
233. Rhode, supra note 195, at 1067-69.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. For a broader discussion of the benefits of using "market-like instruments" be-
cause of the inapplicability and failure of "command and control" regulations like Title VII,
see Cooter, supra note 186, at 133-35.
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identified as underserved.2 37 And, as discussed later, it may very well be
that advanced technology-developed after the 1990s-may prove to be a
silver bullet for racial skewing in film distribution.
Each of these market-driven strategies requires no government
oversight or even substantive additional expenditures. Instead, by negotiat-
ing and contractually assigning new responsibilities and options,
entrepreneurs who recognize discrimination in non-competitive markets
stand both to reap impressive profits and drive larger economic growth.238
Within previously non-competitive markets, for example, financial ser-
vices and banking, the wave of post-deregulation competition
substantially increased racial equity across a variety of metrics while the
markets experienced rapid growth and record profits.2 39
The direct nexus between antitrust law and discriminatory practices
remains relatively unexplored as a viable remedy. However, there are some
scholars-Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Cooter among them-who
have presciently invited a discussion of the connection between racially
disparate market impacts, highly consolidated industries, and antitrust
remedies. Although these academics have touched upon the relationship
between competition and inequality, their works remain solicitations for
further inquiries into the practical application of antitrust law to issues of
discrimination.
Professor Ayres characterizes the perceived opposition between civil
rights laws and the free market as a historical misunderstanding, arguing
instead that "disparate impact law can complement antitrust and consum-
er protection law to make markets more competitive and more
equitable."24 0 Perfect competition, according to Professor Ayres, forces de-
cision-makers in a given industry to adopt policies based on substantive
factors because rival firms create the need for efficiency, not speculation.241
However, the problem facing industries where inefficiency has lead to
237. The NFL's approach is rare, but it is a notable example of using the threat of a
lawsuit (and the potential discovery that would inevitably ensue) to achieve a contractual
remedy in a non-competitive market. Thus, though the lawsuit might itself have failed, the
public relations implications of the lawsuit forced the NFL to seek a more market-based
solution to the problem and created the "Rooney Rule." See N. JEREMI DURU, ADvANCING
THE BALL 61-86 (2011).
238. In a larger context, this discrimination extends to the economic development of
a variety of markets and is not limited to non-competitive markets. See, e.g., Keith Hylton
& Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence and the
Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237 (1996).
239. See, e.g., Ross Levine, Racial Discrimination and Competition (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper Series 14273, 2008).
240. Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard For As-
sessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REv. 669, 674 (2007).
241. Id. at 676-77.
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racially disproportionate outcomes is that the benchmark for competition
is either extremely low or unenforced by the government.242
As Professor Ayres explains, the risk associated with relaxed com-
petitive standards in insulated industries is the unequal treatment of racial
minorities.24 3 While this disparity should concern advocates for equality,
the absence of "the same equal protection norm[s that] undergird[ the
social concern with both civil rights and antitrust discrimination" offers
an opportunity to import the arm of antitrust law into the arena of racial
discrimination.2 44 Currently, meeting competition means doing as little as
the market requires. This affords monopolies and oligopolies the defense
of claiming that their minimalist practices were consistent with what was
economically required given the level of competition. As Professor Suggs
explains, these minimalist practices often manifest themselves in the use of
racial stereotypes to skirt rising costs associated with the acquisition of
information.2 45 In markets where the facade of competition glosses over
the absence of meaningful engagement, and where firms can implement
market stereotypes without fear of reliability and efficiency, antitrust law
can "restrict disparate impacts that are caused by anti-competitive con-
duct" without overstepping its bounds.24 6
Professor Ayres does not therein intend to fully detail the practical
implementation of antitrust law for the purpose of negotiating obstacles
posed by racial bias; however, his insights regarding the relationship be-
tween anti-discrimination and antitrust law invite a discussion of how
competition laws can have a pragmatic effect on discriminatory practices
in the marketplace.247 Simply put, the potential union of antitrust and an-
ti-discrimination is not "a mere marriage of convenience."248
Contemporary research of these intersections suggests that one of the
"evils" common to the destruction of competition is racial bias.249 So how
might one have used antitrust law to achieve a less racially biased market?
D. Legal Challenges: Likelihood of Success
Thinking back, if one agrees that racial skewing may be present in
this market, that the market was highly consolidated, that the racial skew-
ing may have been caused by the antitrust problems, and that antitrust law
242. Id. at 677.
243. Id. at 678.
244. Id. at 679.
245. Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning The Well: Law & Economics And Racial Inequality, 57
HASTINGs L.J. 255, 287 (2005).
246. Ayres, supra note 240, at 719.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 674.
249. See generally, Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: The Persistence of Discrimina-
tion, 9 MICH.J. RACE & L. 31 (2003).
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could (in theory) be used to address this racial skewing, the final question
might be, how could individuals and corporations harmed by these ac-
tions have mounted such a challenge?
We can imagine such a challenge would have begun with an assess-
ment of core antitrust doctrine and its direct applicability to this market.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act bans collaborations-contractual or con-
spiratorial-that restrain commerce. 2 50 Section 2 bans monopolies and
attempts to monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations." 251' The Sherman Act subjects of-
212
fending corporations to maximum fines of up to $100 million. In
addition, Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows a plaintiff to recover treble
damages if he can prove he has been "injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," including Sherman
Act violations.253 Antitrust lawsuits can be brought by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, states, and private
254litigants. Given the context of Paramount and other cases, those chal-
lenging the industry's market-wide racial disparities in distribution would
likely focus their efforts on establishing the nexus between the injuries
described earlier and Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
During the period studied here, to prove violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, a plaintiff would have to show "(1) a contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy; (2) in restraint of trade; (3) affecting interstate
commerce." 2 55 The key consideration in a Section 1 claim is whether the
defendants' "conduct toward [would-be competitors] stemmed from in-
dependent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express" with allied
companies to control a market.256 Such an agreement can be inferred by
"parallel business behavior"-if companies alleged to be conspiring with
one another make the same types of business decisions-but such parallel
behavior does not definitively show such an agreement.257
Because Section 1 violations do not apply to unilateral conduct, the
essential element is the establishment of an agreement between the ac-
cused.258 Although the agreement is vital to the entire action, courts have
historically been willing to accept indirect proof of such an unlawful ar-
rangement provided there was evidence that eliminated the possibility
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
251. Id. § 2.
252. Id.
253. Id. § 15(a).
254. See, e.g., PHILLIP A. PROGER, ANTITRUST PRIMER MATERIALS, at L.C (2010).
255. Maric v. St. Agnes Hosp. Corp., 65 E3d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1995).
256. Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
257. Id. at 541.
258. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,768 (1984).
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that each defendant acted individually. 25 9 To this end, courts recognized
certain "plus factors" that are symptomatic of a collusive agreement,260 and
among these was a pattern of parallel conduct between the defendants.261
It might be possible that studios and distributors were engaged in
parallel distribution strategies.The evidence discussed earlier in this article
suggests that studios and distributors in Hollywood regularly
undersupplied the market with majority-minority films capable of gener-
ating the same overall revenues as "White" movies. Despite the lack of
evidence demonstrating a concrete agreement by the "Big 5" to distribute
these majority-minority films according to a predetermined scheme, the
amount of revenue foregone by the inefficient distribution of these films
might suggest collusion by major players in order for big-budget
high-potential investments to crowd the market. It is counterintuitive that
over a ten-year period, complex and sophisticated corporations specializ-
ing in the production and distribution of films would not recognize the
lost potential for profits and remedy market inefficiency.
Yet, approaching the Section 1 violation through parallel conduct is
challenging when the alleged conduct is judged by a subjective view of
the accused's business practice. More specifically, alleging that the contin-
uous underdistribution of majority-minority films throughout the 1990s
is evidence of a conspiracy to maintain an insulated system rests on the
assumption that the distribution regime is itself inefficient, independent,
and alterable. Further, parallel conduct may not have been sufficient to
explain away the possibility that industry leaders were actually operating
similarly because the industry was subject to certain informal assumptions
that led to the demonstrated inefficiencies.262
The more likely antitrust action during the 1990s would have relied
on Section 1 and shifted the focus away from racial inefficiencies to con-
crete actions taken by the studios and distributors that tended to suggest a
desire to secure a monopoly. One such action could have been
challenging the de facto union of Universal, Paramount, and MGM under
the umbrella of United International Pictures. Although joint ventures are
not per se violations of antitrust law, the creation of a confederacy that
unduly restrains trade without adding pro-competitive benefits may have
been found unlawful under the Rule of Reason analysis.263 If further evi-
259. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986).
260. See, e.g.,Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cit. 2000).
261. Id.
262. No industry operates completely efficiently Invariably there are some factors
that cause industry wide, inefficient practices.
263. See Bd. ofTrade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (finding that
under the Rule of Reason analysis, "[t]he true test of legality is whether the restraint im-
posed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.")
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dence were to be gathered indicating that the United International Pic-
tures conglomerate was designed to drive out competitors and share
profits, it is more likely that this "plus factor" might have withstood initial
judicial skepticism. And, finally, even if individual plaintiffs' antitrust evi-
dence lacked persuasive power, it is possible that sufficient complaint
about these practices and a reinvigorated DOJ under President Clinton
might have used such complaints to conduct a wide-ranging fact finding
mission that could have led to government intervention. However, there
was no such plaintiff complaint and no such government action, and with
a strong shift in the DOJ shortly after the 1990s concluded, aggressive
government intervention would prove unlikely.264
Another strategy for a minimally plausible antitrust action by affect-
ed market participants would have been demonstrating the power of the
dominant player's market share and the concomitant antitrust injuries.
While complaints centered on monopolization under the Sherman Act
generally look at "predominant market share," courts during this period
intervened even in matters where companies control less of the market in
separate, but related, antitrust contexts. For example, in FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., the D.C. Circuit ordered a preliminary injunction to prevent the
merger of the second and third largest baby food companies in the Unit-
ed States.265 The largest baby food company, Gerber, controlled 65 percent
of the market.66 The Federal Trade Commission was concerned, however,
that the merger of Heinz (17.4 percent market share) and Beech-Nut
(15.4 percent market share) would reduce competition in the market un-
der another federal antitrust law, the Clayton Act.
The D.C. Circuit agreed to grant the injunction and compel further
review based on calculations under HHI, which, as described earlier, is a
commonly used measure of market concentration in merger cases.
Though HHI is not as commonly used in cases that hinge on whether
companies already monopolize a market under the Sherman Act, the fact
that a proposed merger that would create a company that controlled only
about one-third of a distinct market indicates that companies that have
less than a "predominant market share" may raise some antitrust concerns.
Ultimately, if the purpose of the Sherman Act is "to secure equality
of opportunity and to protect the public against evils commonly incident
to destruction of competition," antitrust enforcement could be seen as
264. And, to be fair, certain indicators of concentration diminished later in the 1990s
as niche players like DreamWorks SKG and others became distributors, temporarily push-
ing the HHI below 1,500 under some calculations.
265. 246 F3d 711,727 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
266. Id. at 711.
267. Id. For comparison's sake, Buena Vista's share of the domestic box office market
in 2000 was 15.9 percent. Studio Market Share, Box OFFICE MOjo, http://
boxofficemojo.coin/studio/?view=company&view2=yearly&yr= 2 000&p=.htrn (last ac-
cessed Oct. 30, 2012).
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clearly applicable to discrimination claims or as an integrated component
of anti-discrimination law. 268 However, though evidence of the type de-
scribed in this Article may have been useful to confront anti-competitive
behavior in the 1990s, certainly the mere presence of an anti-competitive
atmosphere in the Hollywood film market would not have been sufficient
to establish an antitrust action against major studios and distributors. In-
stead, an actual antitrust violation must be demonstrated: that is,
affirmative conduct on the part of the accused tending towards the acqui-
sition or attempted acquisition of monopoly power needs to be shown.269
While indicators such as inordinately high market shares or the extraction
of supra-competitive profits might have allowed for the inference of an
antitrust violation,270 certainly plaintiffs in such an action would have
needed more to survive summary judgment.
More recently, subsequent to the period studied here, such opportu-
nities for antitrust actions may have been further diminished because of
the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.27' In
Twombly, the Court affirmed a lower court's decision to dismiss a claim
that various telecommunications companies were violating Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.272 The Court held that "absent some factual context
suggesting agreement" among the defendants to restrain trade, approval of
a motion to dismiss was appropriate.273 In their claim, the plaintiffs alleged
that Bell Atlantic and other defendants engaged in "parallel conduct unfa-
vorable to competition."27 4 The Court found there could have been "an
obvious alternative explanation" aside from unlawful agreement between
the defendants to explain why they were engaging in the same types of
.- 275business decisions.
268. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters of U.S. & Canada, 260 U.S. 501, 512
(1922).
269. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAw HANDBOOK 2009-2010 EDITION 423
(2009).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).The D.C.
Circuit rejected Microsoft's defense that it could not have monopoly power because alt-
hough short-term prices were lower, the long-term price of its products was monopolistic.
Moreover, the court noted that Microsoft's popularity was indicative of inordinate market
power.
271. Prior to Twombly, harmed market participants could have initially relied on a
more lenient pleading standard for their antitrust claims. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 335
U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (pleadings are sufficient enough to withstand a motion to dismiss if they
"give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests").
272. 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007).
273. Id. at 549.
274. Id. at 548-49.
275. Id. at 567.
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Twombly was, at least in part, motivated by the Court's concerns
about the high costs of modern-day discovery in complex civil cases.
The Court seemed to be establishing a heightened standard for pleading
to ensure defendants are not subjected to the "potentially enormous ex-
pense of discovery" based on allegations that may not even pass a simple
laugh test.277 Therefore, the Court held that pleadings require "more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do."278 While the Court stopped short of forcing
plaintiffs to show their claims were probably true, it did say their pleadings
must include "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of illegal agreement."27 9
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court expanded its reasoning from Twomblys
antitrust context to pleadings more broadly defined.280 In Iqbal, the Court
had to decide whether a Pakistani Muslim detained after the September
11 terrorist attacks had filed pleadings with enough factual heft to survive
a motion to dismiss. The Court also laid out a two-step framework for
courts to use when deciding whether a claim pleads enough sufficient
facts to survive a motion to dismiss:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly.
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the alle-
gations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suf-
fice. ... Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of
Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and com-
mon sense.
This two-step process has guided decisions on dismissal requests in recent
antitrust cases, but none of these cases definitively foreclose an effort to
challenge the Hollywood market practices described earlier.281
276. Id. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defend-
ants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.").
277. Id.
278. Id. at 555.
279. Id. at 556.
280. 556 U.S. 662, 666, 684 (2009).
281. See, e.g., Gregory G.Wrobel et al.,Judicial Application of the Twombly/lqbal Plau-
sibility Standard in Antitrust Cases, 26 ANTITRUST 8 (2011); see also In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litig., 630 E3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that Twombly's scope is still "un-
settled," but that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence of illegal collusion and price fixing
could survive an initial Twombly inquiry); Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery:
Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187,
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In short, though the path to eliminating market-wide racial bias
through antitrust law has remained open for quite some time, no signifi-
cant efforts have been undertaken to mount such a challenge. So what
remedies might be left?
E. Alternative Solutions
To that end, there are some scholars who suggest that since markets
have failed to correct for this problem in the past, the market-based solu-
tions or antitrust remedies proposed herein are unlikely to be
implemented. Therefore, they suggest, non-market based legal remedies
will provide for swifter justice. Alternatively, others suggest that "cognitive
282bias" may play a role in the decision-making process.22 But, this problem
need not be so rigidly formulated. It may be that markets have in fact not
been fully aware of these racial inequities and their causes; better data,
marketing, and research alone can propel markets forward. Another reason
may be that large organizations, insulated from pure competition, may
have no reason to question their assumptions about their core consumers.
If film distributors and (to a lesser extent) theater chains have historically
believed that customers harbor racial bias, they may be particularly re-
sistant to change even in the face of contradictory evidence.283 In any case,
it seems imperative that major distributors and chains should determine
just why biased outcomes continue to exist and whether they are now
indeed most efficiently maximizing the profit that each side so desperately
284
wants.
Further, if it is true that industry-wide phenomena and racial-bias in
market outcomes are not easily susceptible to mass litigation, then the best
way to solve intractable race bias problems is through industry-level
197 (2011) ("Indeed, the impact of the Twombly/Iqbal rule could vary across different clas-
ses of cases. But the reported cases in antitrust, however, do not indicate any undue shift in
favor of defendants.").
282. Although cognitive bias is not explored at length here, it may be the case that
cognitive bias of decision-makers interacts (in the statistical sense) with the relatively anti-
competitive market structure, thus exacerbating the problem. More work must be done to
engage this interaction and explore the intersection of these two areas.
283. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 112 (2007). Ayres briefly describes cogni-
tive deficiencies of decision makers and explains that "once we form a mistaken belief
about something, we tend to cling to it. As new evidence arrives, we're likely to discount
disconfirming evidence and focus instead on evidence that supports our preexisting be-
liefs."
284. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Remedying Organizational Discrimination at 242 in LEGALITY
AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK (Robert Kagan,
Martin Krygier, & Kenneth Wilson, eds., 2002) (describing how some large organizations
have responded to marketplace inequity or perceptions of internal decision-making bias
by adopting "a process of data gathering and analysis to identify the patterns of decision
making that risk producing bias").
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analysis and market-based solutions derived either from within or by gen-
tle prodding from antitrust authorities. There are not many markets that
are highly visible, highly consolidated, and left untouched by traditional
anti-discrimination laws; however, the Hollywood production and distri-
bution system is one of them-for now.
CONCLUSION
Rethinking the nexus between industry consolidation and racially
skewed market discrimination may prove more rewarding as a method to
reducing racial inequality and disparities in commercial outcomes. As a
first step in that direction, this Article presents initial evidence that com-
petition in Hollywood, if it could be classified as such, has been limited
and that limited level of competition results in both racially-skewed and
inefficient outcomes. The net harm as a result of that lack of competition
has been a persistent and unique form of racial inequity in market out-
comes that has not been adequately remedied and shows (at least during
the period studied here) little signs of abating. The long arm of antitrust
law did force a small amount of industry change some seventy-odd years
ago, but results since then suggest that the initial pro-competitive legal
remedies failed to accomplish their objectives or simply caused a shift in
industry organization leading to market domination by the major studios
repackaged in slightly different forms. Evidence gathered for this Article
makes clear that during the 1990s and earlier the industry was character-
ized by racial impasse in the film distribution process.
To test how the rapid change in technology and demand in recent
years could change distribution outcomes, more study is needed. There-
fore, having established a baseline from which one might begin to
question marketplace efficiency and consider the role of market consoli-
dation and antitrust law in promoting racial equality, future work building
on this evidence might trace developments in the period 2001-10 that
particularly focus on whether radical changes to the industry brought by
technology and refined modeling reversed the trend of racially-biased
outcomes shown here. In addition, such work might further explore, us-
ing consumer-level data, the role that individual racial preferences might
play in structuring product markets and the extent to which corporations
might steer products in an attempt to match or mimic consumer prefer-
ences. Finally, with the perspective of recent events (e.g., conditions
imposed on the Comcast/NBC Universal merger), one might ask wheth-
er antitrust law has indeed finally begun to be recognized as an additional
tool in the arsenal for achieving racial equality in commerce and across
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markets. 285 But reflecting on Hollywood's first century and the lessons of
the recent past might still lead one to conclude that the racial market
skewing and inefficiencies identified in this Article might persist notwith-
standing technological developments. If such skewing is to be remedied,
history suggests that traditional anti-discrimination regimes are not the
answer. Antitrust is an option. Perhaps advocates for equality in
Hollywood may want to consider sharpening some new tools in their
anti-discrimination toolbox.
285. Bob Fernandez, How Comcast Sealed the NBCU Deal, PHILLY.COM (Jan. 23,
2011), http://artices.philly.com/2011-01-23/business/27044733-1-nbcu-deal-comcast-
shareholder-largest-cable-distributor/.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
MODEL: PER-THEATER GRoss (IN $ PER THEATER)
(RANGE OFYEARS 1991-2000)
OLS REGRESSION WHERE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS REVENUE PER THEATER
AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T Ratio P Value
Monthly 15 .11455 7.886 -2.88 .004"
Running Time .2799 .05985 4.68 .000"
R Rating -.758 2.104 -.36 .719
Min. Lead .104 2.659 .04 .969
Woman Lead .048 2.219 .02 .983
Min. Co-Star 2.186 2.468 .89 .377
Comedy 4.758 2.246 2.12 .035
Majority Minority 2.191 2.958 .74 .460
Romance 1.639 3.045 .54 .591
White Male Star 10.427 2.332 4.47 .000"
African-American Star 2.477 2.791 .89 .376
*= significant at .05, "= significant at .01
N=250 s = 14.29 R-sq = 25.3% R-sq(adj)= 21.5% constant= -22.696.
TABLE 2
MODEL: TOTAL U.S. BOX-OFFICE REVENUE
(RANGE OFYEARS 1991-2000)
OLS REGRESSION WHERE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS REVENUE
AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T Ratio P Value
Running Time .5808 .1524 3.81 .000"
R Rating -10.713 5.363 -2.00 .047*
Min. Lead -9.125 6.516 -1.40 .163
Woman Lead .027 5.663 .00 .996
Min. Co-Star 3.624 6.280 .58 .564
Comedy 9.786 5.725 1.71 .089
Majority Minority -11.171 7.532 -1.48 .139
Romance 2.438 7.969 .31 .760
White Male Star 35.031 5.901 5.94 .000"*
African-American Star 13.868 7.054 1.97 .050
Woman Star 14.728 8.900 1.65 .099
* = significant at .05, = significant at .01
N=250 s = 36.19 R-sq = 31.3% R-sq(adj)= 28.1%
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TABLE 3
MODEL: FILM DISTRIBUTION To THEATERS (IN # OF THEATERS)
(RANGE OFYEARS 1991-2000)
OLS REGRESSION WHERE DEPENDENT VARIABLE Is NUMBER OF THEATERS
AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Variable (N=250) Coefficient Std. Error T Ratio P Value
Constant 2301.4 241.5 9.53 .000"
Monthly 15 3.114 1.688 1.84 .066
Running Time -5.935 1.845 -3.22 .001"
R Rating -202.06 63.62 -3.18 .002
Min. Lead -169.76 79.76 -2.13 .034
Woman Lead 20.03 66.67 .30 .764
Woman Star -8.6 105.4 -.08 .935
Min. Co-Star 56.7 148.0 .38 .702
Comedy -138.87 67.84 -2.05 .042
Majority Minority -486.45 89.93 -5.41 .000"
Romance -139.54 94.16 -1.48 .140
White Male Star 198.35 74.62 2.66 .008
African-American Star 229.31 83.71 2.74 .007
African-American Co- -64.8 145.2 -.45 .656
Star
Box-Office Gross 7.1734 .8071 8.89 .000"
(Demand)
*= significant at .05, = significant at .01
N=250 s = 424.9 R-sq = 61.1% R-sq(adj) = 58.8%
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS / DESCRIPTIONS
Examination of computer-generated normality graphs and residual
plots demonstrated that the data, when appropriate, supported the appli-
cation of a general linear regression model. The residuals seem evenly
distributed yielding an expected value of zero, thus they are unbiased.
They are also uncorrelated, meaning that no discernable pattern is ob-
served in the plots. The residuals also satisfy concerns about
homoscedasticity.286
Movies: demographic information for a total of 274 movies span-
ning the years 1991-2000 ("the 1990s") was collected. The 274 movie
dataset contains more than one hundred films featuring minority actors in
leading roles. To ensure a wide range of distribution in key variables with-
in the dataset, all movies with available full demographic information and
released on more than five hundred screens between May 1997 and Au-
gust 1998 were included in the dataset as controls.
Monthly (Top) 15: Continuous data (in millions) for the total box
office collected during the month of the film's release.
Running Time: Continuous variable measuring length of time that
the movie plays on each screen. A longer running time means that the
movie can be shown on less screens per day; therefore, less per-theater
revenue would be expected for longer movies.
Maximum Theaters: A continuous variable measuring the maximum
amount of theaters to which a film was distributed. A large number here
indicates a studio's prediction that the movie will be a "blockbuster."
Rated R: Whether the movie was given an "R" rating by the Mo-
tion Picture Association ofnAmerica (MPAA). Movies with "R" ratings are
expected to generate less box office revenues.
Box OFFICE STARVARIABLES
To qualify as a box office star, an actor had to have appeared in a
previous movie which met the following criteria: (a) released during the
period between 1988 and 2000, (b) qualified by its U.S. gross to be in the
Top 20 percent of all movies released during this time frame, and (c)
which generated more than $60 million in total U.S. box office revenues.
When the previous movie contained an ensemble cast without a primary
solo performance, the actor was not included.
286. The inclusion of three box-office large release flops and four mega-hits would
have called these distributions into question. Therefore, to ensure that the glr model's as-
sumptions regarding distribution tail normality were met, when appropriate and prior to
the regressions, key attributes for the movies TIrANIC (20th Century Fox 1997), MEN IN
BLACK (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1997), INDEPENDENCE DAY (20th Century Fox 1995),
MAJOR LEAGUE: BACK TO THE MINORs (Warner Bros. Pictures 1998), and THE LosT WORLD:
JURAssIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1997) were removed to ensure a reliable analysis.
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Two CATEGORIES OF "RACE/STAR"
White Male Star: Whether the movie includes a White male box of-
fice star in a lead (starring role). This list contained: Bruce Willis, Michael
Douglas, Harrison Ford, Anthony Hopkins, Jack Nicholson, Kevin Cost-
ner, Daniel Stern, Keanu Reeves, Nicholas Cage, Mel Gibson, Sylvester
Stallone, Dustin Hoffman, Brad Pitt, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Robert
DeNiro, John Travolta, Robin Williams, Joe Pesci, Stephen Segall, Tommy
Lee Jones, Sean Connery, Tom Cruise, Jeff Goldblum, Leonardo DiCaprio,
Woody Harrelson, George Clooney, Tom Hanks, Pierce Brosnan, and Jim
Carrey.
Black Star: Whether a box office star who is also Black or African-
American starred in the movie. The list contained: Morgan Freeman, Will
Smith, Eddie Murphy, Martin Lawrence, Samuel L. Jackson, Wesley
Snipes, Whitney Houston, Denzel Washington, Whoopi Goldberg, Danny
Glover, and Michael Jordan.
Woman Star:Whether a box office star who is also a woman starred
in the movie.The list contained:Julia Roberts,Whitney Houston, Camer-
on Diaz, Whoopi Goldberg, Meg Ryan, Jodie Foster, Drew Barrymore,
Rene Russo, Michelle Pfeiffer, Sharon Stone,Vanessa Williams, and Sandra
Bullock.
Minority Lead:Whether a lead character (by screen time as approx-
imated by billing) is self-identified or press-identified as
Black/Latino/Asian-American. This category includes any ethnic minori-
ty in a leading role, whether a box office star or otherwise.
Woman Lead: Whether a lead character (by screen time as approxi-
mated by billing) is a woman. This variable included women box office
stars, as well as those without previously successful movies.
Minority Co-star: Whether a co-starring character (by screen time
as approximated by billing) is self-identified or press-identified as
Black/Latino/Asian-American.
African-American Co-Star: Whether a co-starring character (by
screen time as approximated by billing) is self-identified or press-
identified as Black or African-American.
Comedy: Whether the movie was advertised or reviewed as a "com-
edy" in popular press. Press accounts and reviews were generated from
Entertainment Weekly andVideohound.The author then coded the mov-
ie when one or more sources characterized the movie as a "comedy."
Majority-Minority: Whether the movie's main characters were pri-
marily members of ethnic nuinority groups. For this variable, two
measurements were compared. The primary metric was whether the first
ten billed characters, as listed on IMDB.com and secondary websites, were
members of ethnic minority groups. When this metric yielded a result
that was within a discrete band (40-60 percent), measurement was re-
calculated by determining whether the top ten characters (by screen time)
60 [VOL. 18:1
FALL 2012] Hollywood's Perpetual Antitrust Dilemma 61
were members of ethnic minority groups. For example, Denzel Washing-
ton's performance in Philadelphia would not qualify but Malcolm X would.
Romance: Whether the movie was advertised or reviewed as a "love
story," "romance story," or "romantic comedy" in popular press. Press ac-
counts and reviews were generated from Entertainment Weekly and
Videohound and coded by the author when one or more sources charac-
terized the movie using the phrases above.
Box-Office Gross: Total U.S. gross revenues reported as of February
2001 for all tickets sold at all showings of the movie.
Per-Theater Gross: The total U.S. gross revenue divided by the max-
imum number of screens the movie was shown on, which was based upon
a count of total theaters.

